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The Security and Foreign Policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran: An Offensive Realism
Perspective

Bledar Prifti
ABSTRACT

This study argues that security and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran
is mainly driven by the main principles of the Offensive Realism theory of international
relations. While the Iranian political system is considered a theocratic system, based on
the Islamic Shi‘a ideology, its survival is defined as the ultimate ideology—an ideology
that is paramount to any other ideology. Iran‘s security and foreign policy is determined
and shaped by its need to survive in an anarchic international system. Iran‘s cooperation
with ―two Satans‖, Israel and the United States, during the Iran-Iraq war demonstrates
that the ultimate ideology of survival dominates over any other ideological
predisposition. In addition, the lack of a supranational government and the fear about the
intentions of other states make Iran aware of the need to rely on self-help. Iran has also
realized that the best way to limit threats to its survival would be maximizing its relative
military power and becoming a regional hegemony. Furthermore, a formidable military
power would provide Iran with a new status in regional and global politics, deterrence
power over any possible attack from other great powers, and bargaining power over
regional and global matters. In order to enhance its military (conventional and nuclear)
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arsenal, Iran has established ―strategic relations‖ with its historic enemy, Russia.
In its quest to advance its military capabilities and avoid threats to its sovereignty, Iran
sided with Christian states, against its Muslim brothers, during the Russia-Chechnya and
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflicts. Moreover, the Islamic state is aware of the fact that its
paramount goals can be achieved by relying on precise rational strategies. In order to
validate these claims, this study analyzes Iran‘s policy during the Iran-Iraq war and
Iran‘s policy toward Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict, the Russian-Chechen conflict, and
the U.S. invasion of Iran.

iv

Chapter One
Introduction
After the sudden and prominent success of the Islamic Revolution in deposing the
Shah‘s regime, and the coming into power of Grand Ayatollah Sayyed Ruhollah
Khomeini in 1979, Iran's political behavior has had its own trajectory and traits that have
bewildered not only the foreign governments but also the political scientists who
endeavor to provide scientific explanations to such political behavior. This rapid and
radical change of the political system and its institutions has had an enormous impact on
how the security and foreign policy of the new Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) was to be
conducted by the new Iranian power elite in the years to come. After decades of close
relationships and alliance with the United States and the West, Iran became the symbol of
anti-Americanism and one of the most serious challengers of the American interests in
the Middle East. Iran‘s new political system demanded for a new era of political relations
and for a new position of Iran in both the regional and global arena. While for many
states the problem is to separate state from religion, for most governments and
international relations experts the problem is to separate speeches from actions, or words
from deeds. Iran was one of the countries whose propaganda, or political rhetoric, rarely
matched its actions.
Following the characteristics of the new Islamic state, many would think and
believe that Iran's security and foreign policy would be based on religious rules and
predispositions. Shi‟a Islam became the leading anti-Shah ideology during the revolution
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and received much of its potency by promulgating a fierce opposition against the policies
of the United States and other Western powers. It culminated in Khomeini‘s speech of
November 1979 when the Supreme Leader flamboyantly demonized and named the
United States as the Great Satan (Beeman 1983, 191-192). Later, he would call Israel the
Small Satan. However, this assumption was soon to be shaken by the Iran-Contra Affair,
which became public in November of 1986. The affair consisted of systematic and
intensive dealings between Iran, on the one side, and the United States and Israel, on the
other side. The Iran-Contra scandal happened in a time when Iran was fighting for its
survival against a very aggressive Iraq. In addition, the Russian-Chechen conflict
revealed more of the nature of Iran‘s security and foreign policy. Iran's pro-Russian
position was exercised in a time when Iran so desperately needed military and militaryled technological support to confront its adversaries, to survive, and to increase its
influence in the region. Iran‘s security and foreign policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict and the U.S. invasion of Iraq are two other cases that reveal the real nature of
Iran‘s security and foreign policy.
These events have brought to the minds of many scholars questions about the real
principles that guide the Iranian security and foreign policy. Is the Iranian security and
foreign policy guided by religious predispositions or by its need to survive in an anarchic
international system? Thus, among others, the central question that this study endeavors
to answers is: Is the Iranian security and foreign policy guided by ideology or by the
reality of current international system of politics?
This study endeavors to provide answers to the following questions related to ―the
words and deeds‖ of Iran‘s security and foreign policy: What drives Iran‘s security and
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foreign policy? Why does Iran behave the way it does? What are the paradoxes of Iran‘s
security and foreign policy? Is Iran‘s security and foreign policy driven by ideology and
religious predispositions or by rationalism? Does Iran really intend to ―wipe out‖ the state
of Israel? Will Iran build a nuclear weapon if the opportunity is given? What does all this
mean for the international system of politics? What are some of the main challenges that
the international system faces today when it comes to Iran‘s security and foreign policy?
Regardless of the responses to the above questions, there cannot be a single
answer that can provide a comprehensive explanation of the Iranian security and foreign
policy. There is no theory that explains everything.
Nevertheless, there are always theories that provide a better explanation or
definition of the political reality. Following this assumption, this study endeavors to
explain that Iran‘s security and foreign policy is shaped by the nature of the international
system of politics, as defined under the principles of the Offensive Realism Theory of
international relations (Mearsheimer 2001). The theory holds that the states are the main
actors of the international system. In addition, the international system lacks a central
government and is in a permanent state of anarchy. States also possess certain military
powers, which make them capable of hurting or even destroying one another. Moreover,
states are suspicious of the intentions of the other states. Finally, the top-priority goal of
the states is their survival. The survival can be assured only when there is no other power
in the system capable of threatening the existence of a state, meaning that the state has
reached the status of hegemony.
In order to ensure their survival in this anarchic system, states rely on self-help
and calculate their interests and powers in conjunction with the interests and powers of
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the other states. Fear and assurance both lead to permanent change of status. States fear
each other and seek to ensure their existence by eliminating any real or perceived threat.
As such, states can hardly accept their status quo, unless they become hegemony.
Survival in an anarchic international system of politics is the only status quo ideology—
the ultimate ideology that cannot be changed for any other ideology. One, being a person
or a state, can trade one‘s ideology for another. Nevertheless, one cannot trade its
(his/her) existence for an ideology. If it happens, what would be the point or what would
be left of it (his/her)? Nothing existential!
However, this study does not claim that there exist a dichotomical relationship
between the Islamic ideology and offensive realism. Nor does it claim that one
perspective or another can explain everything related to Iran's security and foreign policy.
While Shi‘ism may have significant impact on the Iran‘s internal policies, in the
international arena, Iran is forced to comply with Machiavelli‘s reason d‟état. The main
argument of this study is to provide an adequate and efficient analysis that would indicate
that survival is the ultimate ideology of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Iran seeks to ensure
its survival in this anarchic system by increasing its powers vis-a-vis the powers of the
other states. This main goal of the Islamic Republic is incorporated in and explained by
the Offensive Realism Theory of the international relation.
The methodology that will be used to test the theory of offensive realism consists
of multiple case studies, which encompass the most important events during the life of
the Islamic Republic. Case study methodology is considered by many prominent political
scientists as an ―empirical inquiry that (1) investigates a contemporary phenomenon
within its real-life context; when (2) the boundaries between phenomenon and context are
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not clearly evident; and in which (3) multiple sources of evidence are used‖ (Johnson,
Joslyn, and Reynolds 2001, 143). Johnson et al also claim that case study design clearly
identifies political theories that would provide an accurate explanation of the events
incorporated in that case study.
As such, this study argues that the principles of the offensive realism theory
provide an explanation to the events presented through the case studies. A multiple case
study approach will be used in order to provide stronger explanatory power of the theory.
The use of multiple case studies will provide the opportunity to replicate findings and to
repeatedly test the theory for several times. This approach will lead to a higher reliability
of data and procedures implemented to test the theory. Case studies that will be used to
test the theory include: (1) the Iran-Contra Affair, (2) the Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict,
(3) the Russian-Chechen conflict, and (4) the U.S. Invasion of Iraq.
Emphasizing the importance of applying a pure and rigorous theoretical approach
will help the scientific community and government entities not only to have a profound
understanding of Iran‘s security and foreign policy but also to make educated conjectures
about Iran‘s behavior and intentions in the future. Thus, the significance of the study rests
not only on the emphasis that it puts on the theoretical and methodological framework but
also on the importance that the result may have in defining and predicting the behavior of
the Iranian government in the future.
In order to test the theory and provide reasonable and scholarly support for its
claims, this study will analyze the main elements that have contributed to building Iran‘s
current security and foreign policy. Without analyzing and considering all these elements,
it would be impossible to reach a final conclusion about what this study aims to explain.
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First, this study will analyze (but will not argue about) Iran‘s historical elements such as
the Iranian exceptionalism demonstrated throughout the history of Iran, conquests and
exploitations from foreign powers, and major events that have shaped the nature of Iran‘s
politics. The Iranian exceptionalism will consider the Iranians perception of themselves
from the era of Cyrus the Great to the modern times of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi
and Grand Ayatollah Khomeini. In addition, foreign conquests from foreign powers will
include a period of conquests starting with the conquest from Alexander the Great, the
existential threats from Mongols, systematic conquests and exploitations from the
Russians and British, and the unexpected attack from Saddam Hussein in 1980. This
study also will continue with an analysis of the main events that have played a crucial
role in shaping Iran‘s current policies. These events will include the 1953 coup d‘état
against Mohammad Mossadeq and the Iran-Iraq war.
Second, this study will make a thorough analysis of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.
Due to its crucial impact on defining the nature of Iran‘s politics and its current power
structure, this event is analyzed separately from other historical events. The chapter under
the Islamic Revolution will cover major actors and factors such as the Constitutional
Movement of 1906, the White Revolution of the Shah in 1960, the June uprising in 1963,
and other main social and political entities. The study will continue with a separate
chapter on the life, ideas, and the work of the Grand Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of
the Islamic Revolution. Khomeini formulated the velayat-e faqih doctrine and gave Iran
the foundations of the Islamic state. Understanding the velayat-e faqih is crucial to
defining Iran‘s current power politics and its informal power structure. In addition, this
study will provide an analysis of the Islamic Constitution and the informal and formal
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power structure of Iran. Its goal is to divulge the harbor where the real power rests, or
who decides what, when, where, and how. Finally, after going through all these elements,
the study will then conclude with the theoretical approach and case studies to test the
theory.
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Chapter Two
A History of Iran
As mentioned previously, we cannot have a coherent observation of the security
and foreign policy of the modern Iran without analyzing first certain historical factors and
events that have continuously shaped the process of the political and social development
of Iran throughout history. First, the geostrategic position of Iran (Figure 1.) has played a
significant role in shaping Iran‘s history (Iran stands for Aryan, used by Indo-European
peoples who migrated southeast before 1000 B.C.) and its interaction with other states in
the region. Iran borders the Persian Gulf (with its oil richness) to the south, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and the Caspian Sea to the north, Afghanistan and Pakistan to the east, and
Turkey and Iraq to the west. This geographic position makes Iran a very important route
for international trade and geopolitical strategy. Iran‘s prominent role as a trade
geostrategic state dates back during the era of the Sassanid Dynasty and the Silk Road,
which connected China with the West. It continues today through the oil pipes by
connecting Iran with China, Europe, Pakistan, and many other states around the world. It
is this geographical location that has shaped the Iran‘s history and relations with other
states and has given Iran a strategic geopolitical status in the international system of
politics.
In addition, the history of Iran can be divided into three main historical blocs. It is
important to emphasize that each of the blocs should not be considered separated from
the others but as a result of the interconnection between each other. First, the history of
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Iran emphasizes what many scholars consider the Iranian Exceptionalism, which is not
that different from the well-known phrase of the American Exceptionalism. The second
main bloc of the Iranian history incorporates events that deal with systematic conquests
and exploitation of Iran throughout its history from other foreign powers. The third main
bloc of the Iranian history analyzes the birth and the influence of Shi‟a religion on Iran‘s
cultural, social, and political life. This historical bloc will be discussed in details
separately due to its significant role in shaping the Iran‘s image in the world politics.

Figure 1. The Map of Iran. Source: University of Texas—Produced by the CIA
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The Iranian Exceptionalism
The Iranian exceptionalism is a term used in this study to describe perceptiveness,
feelings, and beliefs of the Iranian people and their leaders that their nation (Persia or
Iran) holds a unique place in history and among other nations. Sadegh Zibakalam (n.d.,
85), a professor at the Tehran University, claims that ―the Iranian ‗exceptionalism‘ rests
on two main pillars: (1) the negation of the present world order and (2) the belief in the
inherent superiority of the Iranian civilization‖. The notion of the Iranian exceptionalism
dates back during the reign of Cyrus the Great (600 B.C.—530 B.C.), the founder of the
Persian Empire and the first king of the Achaemenian Dynasty. Under his three decades
of leadership, the Persian Empire (―Persia‖ is the Greek name for Iran) became one of the
largest empires that the world has ever seen throughout its history. Cyrus the Great
became the epitome of a legendary military leader by conquering in a short time three
other empires—Median Empire, Lydian Empire, and the Babylonian Empire. In addition,
he laid the foundations of a successful model of a centralized administration and the
principle of accountability before his people.
But the legacy of Cyrus the Great would not be accurate and complete without
addressing the contribution that he made on religious issues. After seizing the kingdom,
Cyrus the Great established Zoroastrianism as a monotheistic religion whose principles
emphasized the concept of the social justice and the notions of the final judgment and
immortality. He also emphasized and exercised the Zoroastrian principle of the just ruler.
In addition, Cyrus the Great considered himself an instrument of God on earth, and his
right to rule came directly from the will of the Supreme God. From Zoroastrianism,
Cyrus the Great took the notion of the Supreme God, which he thought had entrusted him
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with the task and the legitimacy of uniting people of the earth in one single kingdom of
peace and justice. This belief is tantamount to the belief expressed in the Manifest
Destiny of the new-born American state. The Manifest Destiny was used by many U.S.
politicians to justify their belief that God had provided the United States with the task of
expanding their values throughout the Western hemisphere. Cyrus also implemented
different religious policies and allowed a diversity of religious practices and beliefs. The
most notable contribution is his Edict of Restoration which brought to an end the
Babylonian Captivity of the Jewish people.
Darius the Great (549 B.C.—486 B.C.) is another Persian leader who based his
leadership on the legacy of Cyrus the Great and elevated the Persian identity to higher
stages. Like Cyrus, Darius the Great believed in Ahura Mazda and Zoroastrianism. In
addition, he organized a highly professional army and an administrative system which
served in the future as a model for the Roman Empire. Moreover, Darius created a legal
system based on justice, principles, and the moral code of Zoroastrianism. The main
contribution that Darius brought to the Persian civilization was the building of
Persepolis, which was considered as the main site to celebrate the grandeur of the
Persian Empire and the symbol of the Persian uniqueness in the world.
Darius the Great was succeeded by Xerxes the Great (485–465 BC), the last king
of the Achaemenian Dynasty. Xerxes the Great followed the leadership of Cyrus and
Darius the Great by emphasizing military capabilities and strategies as the main ways for
Persian expansion and security in the world.
In 332 B.C., Persia was conquered by another historical leader—Alexander the
Great. Soon after the conquest, Alexander ordered the Persepolis burned, an action that
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he regretted in the future. The reason for him to order the destruction of Persepolis was
―to take from Persians their sense of self‖ and their identity (Mackey 1996, 31). The next
dynasty to govern Persia after the Greek conquest was the Sassanid Dynasty, which
reined between 224 C.E. and 651C.E. During the Sassanid Dynasty, trade flourished and
the Iranian economy prospered more than ever before. The Silk Road between China and
the West and the geostrategic location of Persia made Persians prosperous and feel that
―they could go anywhere and do everything‖.
In addition, the occupation of Iran by the Arab forces in 651 C.E. and the spread
of Islam throughout Iran revealed again the nature of Iranian exceptionalism. This
occupation also divided the history of Iran in two major timeframes: the Islamic and PreIslamic history. Islam itself was divided in two major sects: Sunni and Shi‟a Islam. The
Iranians embraced Islam but never relinquished their own identity.
In 1501, during the Safavid Empire, Ismail Shah declared the Twelver Shi‟ism as
the official religion of Iran. This came after prolonged conflicts and wars among different
Muslim groups about the interpretation of Koran and the succession of the Prophet. For
Sunnis, the successor of the Prophet does not need to be a descendant of the Prophet and
―would need no exceptional spiritual qualities but would merely have to be an exemplary
Muslim who could ably and virtuously direct the religious and political affairs of the
community‖ (Nasr 2007, 35). On the other hand, Shi‘as argued that the successor should
be a descendant of the Prophet and should possess special spiritual qualities. While
Sunnis chose Abu Bakr (a close friend and the father-in-law of the Prophet), Shi‘as chose
Ali to be the successor of the Prophet. Ali was a cousin, ―virtual adoptive son‖, the sonin-law, and a protector of the Prophet. He became the fourth Caliph of the Muslim
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community and was later killed in confrontation with his Sunnis counterpart, who
established the Umayyad dynasty. This event permanently changed the path of Shi‘ism.
Shi‘a religion became consolidated and broadly-accepted by the people after the battle of
Karbala in 680 C.E when soldiers of the second Umayyad caliph, Yazid I, massacred
Ali‘s son Hussein along with seventy-two of his supporters and family members (2007,
40).
However, the conversion of Iranians to Shi‟ism cannot be considered accidental
but as a choice through which the Iranians decided to retain Islam, and at the same time,
to shape it in such a way that would allow Iranians preserve their identity and values. Iran
accepted Shi‟a Islam because it was a mirror of the Persian culture and of the Iranian
experience. The Iranians saw Shi‘a martyrdom of Ali and Hussein as shadows of
themselves. In addition, Shi‟a Islam and the lives of Ali and Hussein showed Iranians that
they, themselves, were humiliated and defeated throughout the history in their quest for
their rights and the deepest convictions (Mackey 1996, 85). The Iranians found in Ali the
figure of the ―just ruler‖ that they had seen previously in Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes the
Great. Moreover, the Iranians found in Shi‘ism their Zoroastrianist hope for the return of
the savior who would restore justice on earth (the return of the Hidden Imam—the
Mahdi).
However, the real and the vivid symbol of the Iranian identity and exceptionalism
were brought back to life through the Ferdowsi‘s work Shahnameb (around 1000 C.E.).
Many scholars consider Shahnameb a masterpiece that best expose the grandeur of
Persepolis as a symbol of the Iranian identity. For Sandra Mackey, Shahnameb ―evokes a
whole range of images—heroism, justice, national glory, and tragic defeat—that Iranians
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as a people holds essential to their culture and to their identity‖ (Mackey 1996, 63).
Shahnameb awakened what Mackey calls ―the soul of the Iranians‖, and its result was a
long hymn to honor, valor, wisdom, and patriotism (1996, 63). It was a perfect blending
and exposure of the identity and values the Pre-Islamic Iran with the Islamic Iran. It
revived the memories of the Iranians and brought into light the Iranian exceptionalism.
Going back to the Sadegh Zibakalam‘s pillars of Iranian exceptionalism, besides
the ―belief in the inherent superiority of Iranian civilization‖, we may realize the traits of
this Iranian exceptionalism in the negation of the present world order by the Iranian
politicians and governments and the desire to bring back the glory of the Persian Empire.
One example for this case includes the celebration of the 2,500 years of the Persian
Empire by Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi (1919-1980; and the Shah of Iran 1941-1979)
next to the ruins of Persepolis. This celebration of the Persian Empire and the place
chosen for it tell us that the Persian glory still lives in the mind of the Iranians. Cyrus the
Great, his leadership, and the Zoroastrian (Shi‘a) moral code and social justice are still
viewed as the elements of a just world order. Another example that emphasizes the
Iranian exceptionalism is the behavior of the new Islamic State toward the Westerndominated world system. During these thirty years of the Islamic Republic, Iran‘s
security and foreign policy has been predominantly anti-Western and has endeavored to
portray Iran as a unique nation even within the Muslim world. The portretization of the
Islamic Iran as the country whose goal is to unite the Muslim world against the ―evil‖
West is not that far from the belief held by Cyrus the Great who considered it a task given
from the Supreme God to unite people of the earth in one kingdom of justice and peace.
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Foreign Conquests and Exploitation
A second bloc of the Iranian history deals with the frequent and systematic
conquests and exploitations of Iran from other foreign forces throughout the history. The
first major conquest that Iran has endured was its conquest from the Alexander the Great
in 332 B.C. The conquest of Persia came after centuries of glory and dominance. In order
to destroy also the glory of Persia, Alexander the Great obliterated Persepolis, the
symbol of the Persian identity. The second major conquest of Iran occurred in 651 C.E.
when the Islamic Arab forces (the Bedouins) invaded the Sassanid dynasty, following
their goal of spreading the Islamic religion. This occupation, as mentioned earlier,
divided Iran‘s history in the Pre-Islamic and Islamic history. During the Islamic history,
Iran went through a new series of conquests and existential threats from foreign powers.
In addition, the eleventh century brought a series of conquests for Iran. The Seljuk
Turks were the first to invade Iran in the beginning of the century. Even though Seljuk
Turks did not cause any destruction to Iran‘s economy, they seriously threatened Iran
religiously and politically (Mackey 1996, 68). The worse was about to come. In 1206, a
highly skilled and mobile army of Mongols invaded Iran and perpetrated an infamous
spree of killings among the Iranian population. For the first time in its history, Iran was
facing the extermination of its population and its very existence. To make the situation
worse, in 1384, the Tatars invaded Iran and drove the Iranian population further to
extermination. Moreover, in 1514, another threat came from the Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman leader Selim I defeated Ismail Shah of Iran at the battle of Chaldiran and
managed to enter the Iranian capital. Despite the Iranian defeat, due to his army
overextension and disapproval of the invasion, Selim I was forced to retreat.
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Even though the Ottoman occupation of 1514 is considered the last serious threat
to the Iranian heartland, other minor wars followed between Iran and other foreign
powers, resulting in exploitation and annexation of the Iranian territories. The nineteenth
century confronted Iran with two great powers: Russia and Great Britain. Throughout this
period, Great Britain and Russia were the threats and the protectors of Iran, depending on
the balance of power that the Iranian leaders implemented to avoid domination from one
party. This period was characterized by wars and stupendous concessions given to both
the Russians and the British from Iran, such was the Most Favored Nation Clause given
to British in 1841. These concessions culminated in 1872 when the British Baron Julius
de Reuter received a concession that granted him the exclusive right to the Iranian
infrastructure, national banks, mineral extraction, and the exploitation of forests (Ansari
2006, 14; Milani 1994, 25). This was a move by the Prime Minister Mirza Husain Khan
to avoid Iran from falling under the Russian dominance (Keddie 2003, 54). A series of
wars preceded and followed these concessions.
The first war was what is known as The Russian-Persian War. This war continued
from 1804 to 1813. One of the main causes for this war was the Iranian desire to regain
Georgia from Russia. For this reason, Iran (Fath Ali Shah), under the Qajars Dynasty,
signed the Treaty of Finkenstein in which France would help Iran regain Georgia from
Russia in exchange for Iran‘s military help against the British. However, this treaty did
not work because France soon signed a peace treaty with Russia, the Peace of Tilsit
(Ansari 2006, 10). The first war with Russia ended in 1813 with Iran signing the Treaty
of Gulistan, which gave to the Russians other important territories in Caucasia and the
exclusive right to have warships on the Caspian Sea (Keddie 2003, 38).
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The Treaty of Gulistan was later considered ambiguous by the Iranians and
claimed that the Russians were occupying territories that were beyond the provisions of
the treaty. In addition to the ambiguity of the treaty, some clergy members claimed that
the Russians were persecuting other Muslims in their occupied territories. These claims
urged Fath Ali Shah, in 1826, to declare the second war against Russia by proclaiming
jihad. However, the military superiority of Russia decisively defeated the Iranian army.
Iran was forced to sign the Treaty of Turkomanchai, which annexed more territories from
Iran. Among other concessions, this treaty forbade Iran from navigating the Caspian Sea.
In addition, Iran was obligated to sign economic treaties based on the Russian
preferences. Moreover, the Russians had the right to send their consulate envoys
everywhere they please in Iran. Finally, Iran was required to pay Russia a certain amount
of money in retribution.
In 1856, Iran fought another war, but this time against the British army. This war
is called the Anglo-Persia War and was a result of the British responding to the Iranian
quest to occupy the Afghan city of Herat. The British troops managed to force Iran to
abandon the quest of Herat. As a result, Iran and the Great Britain signed the Peace of
Paris in 1857, which forced Iran to renounce its claim for Herat. Since then, the presence
of the British influence in Iran would continue to increase through its cooperation with
Iran in the oil field, which resulted in creation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in
1909.
However, the conquests would not end here. In August 25, 1941 occurred what is
known today as the Anglo-Soviet invasion of Iran. The reason for this invasion dates back
in the outbreak of the WWII when Iran and the Nazi Germany had intensive political and
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economic relations. The Iranian sympathy for the Germans caused great concerns once
the Nazis invaded the Soviet Union in June of 1941. Reza Shah and the elite of the
Iranian politics had openly expressed their sympathy for the Nazi Germany and their
superiority as the Land of the Aryans, which is assumed to be the meaning for Iran.
(Gonzales 2007, 43). Both the British and the Soviets became concerned about any
possible German domination or invasion of Iran, which would cut off the supply for
Soviet troops. To avoid this scenario, the British and the Soviets sent a note to the Iranian
government demanding the expulsion of the Germans from the Iranian territory (Keddie
2003, 105). Reza Shah responded negatively to this note, causing both the Great Britain
and the Soviet Union to invade Iran.
By invading Iran, Great Britain and Russia ensured control over oil supplies, a
vital necessity especially during the time of war against the Nazi Germany, and created a
―land corridor‖ to the Soviet Union. This corridor would be used to supply Soviet troops
with oil and other goods while being at war with the Germans (Abrahamian 2008, 97).
By invading Iran, at the same time, the British and the Soviet forces secured the oil fields
from any possible German invasion. Fearing Reza Shah, the British and the Soviets
decided to depose Reza Shah and to bring into power the young prince Mohammad Reza
Shah. In January 1942, Mohammad Reza Shah, the Great Britain, and the Soviet Union
signed an alliance which obliged the British and Soviets to safeguard the Iranian
economy from the negative impact of the war and mandated the withdrawal of the troops
within six months after the end of the war (Keddie 2003, 105). After the war, the foreign
troops withdrew from Iran, leaving the country in critical economic conditions. The
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British influence on Iran would come to an end in 1953 after the coup d‟état against the
Mohamed Mossadeq and the American involvement in the region.
The 1953 coup d‘état against Mohammad Mossadeq remains one of the most
important events in the Iranian history. It has played a significant role in shaping the
future of not only the domestic policies but also of Iran‘s relations with other states. As
Mark Gasiorowski argues, ―If Mosaddeq had not been overthrown, the revolution might
not have occurred‖ (Gasiorowski 1987, 261). Mossadeq was a Western-educated
politician and was known as a firm nationalist. His popularity made him the leader of the
National Front, which was a coalition of the secular and religious nationalist parties.
Early in his political career, Mossadeq had identified himself with two main issues: ―a
desire to transfer political power from the royal court to the parliament (known as the
Majles), and a desire to increase Iran's control over its oil industry, which was controlled
by the British-owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company‖ (1987, 262).
In 1950, Mossadeq and many other members of the National Front were elected
deputies of the Majles. Together with other representatives of the National Front in
Majles, Mossadeq took initiatives to reduce the power of the Shah and attempted to
organize a nationalist movement against Shah‘s policies that had given to the British a
major portion of the oil industry. For this purpose, Mossadeq submitted a bill to the
Majles aiming at the nationalization of the oil industry. In March 1951, Majles approved
the nationalization of the oil industry and managed to appoint Mossadeq as the Prime
Minister of Iran, against the Shah‘s will. In 1952, Mossadeq resigned his position after
the Shah‘s negative response to his demand for the control of the armed forces. However,
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due to the public pressure, the Shah was forced to reinstate Mossadeq as the Prime
Minister of Iran.
The nationalization of the oil industry and his connections to the Tudeh party
brought Mossadeq in conflict with the British and the United States governments, and
also with the Shah at home. Both governments planned to overthrow Mossadeq. The
British were angered by the nationalization of the oil industry and the Americans saw an
opportunity for the American oil companies to benefit from the Iranian oil production. In
addition, Americans feared the expansion of the Russian communist influence in Iran due
to the Mossadeq‘s close relation with the communist party—Tudeh Party. For this
purpose, the United States launched the operation codenamed BEDAMN. This operation
started in 1948 and aimed at containing the Soviet and the Tudeh influence in Iran and
weakening the National Front by undermining its mass base of support (1987, 268-69).
Iran and the United States had previously signed the Mutual Defense Agreement in 1950
through which U.S. recognized Iran as a strategic country for implementing the Truman
Doctrine. This goal of this doctrine was to contain communism and to limit or destroy the
Soviet influence in the region (Milani 1994, 38).
The British intelligence services and the U.S. Central Intelligence Service (CIA)
made a detailed plan for deposing Mossadeq. The plan consisted of three main strategies.
First, there was the using of legal channels to force Mossadeq accept the International
Court of Justice as the arbiter of the oil disputes. Mossadeq rejected all the proposals.
The second strategy included the undermining of Mossadeq‘s base of support by
imposing stringent economic sanctions and black-mailing his government through
military maneuvering in the region. The third strategy left to be used against Mossadeq

20

was to remove him from the office through covert political actions conducted by antiMossadeq and pro-Western forces in Iran (Gasiorowski 1987, 263). The CIA resumed the
leading role in this operation after the staff of the British embassy left Iran in November,
1952. Meanwhile, and as a result of Mossadeq‘s growing popularity and power, the Shah
was forced to go in exile in 1953.
The coup organized by the CIA aimed at promoting anti-Mossadeq propaganda
from the opposition and encouraging high military officers to organize against Mossadeq.
The operation for this purpose was named the Operation AJAX and was directed by the
CIA officer Kermit Roosevelt in collaboration with the British M16 (Bergman 2008, 4;
Gasiorowski 1987, 271). Besides the Shah, there were three main groups within Iran that
brought down Mossadeq. The first group included a group of military officers led by
Fazlollah Zahedi. Zahedi was a retired general and member of the Senate who also
headed the Retired Officers' Association. The second group included members of the
National Front who wanted Mossadeq deposed. In this group were the Rashidian
brothers, who were the key players of the anti-Mossadeq movements before the coup.
The third group included prominent figures of the National Front who worked to
undermine Mossadeq‘s political base of support. This group included Hussein Makki, and
Ayatollah Kashani (Gasiorowski 1987, 269).
The coup succeeded in overthrowing Mossadeq in August 19, 1953. Soon after
the coup, Mossadeq was arrested and Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi returned home and
instituted the martial law throughout the country. This was followed by a long series of
arrests of the supporters of the National Front and of the Tudeh Party. The Press
censorship was instituted and the pro-Mossadeq demonstrations were crushed by Shah‘s
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military and militia forces. In addition, the Shah, with the help of the CIA, established the
most fearful and notorious secret police forces of the modern Iran named SAVAK.
Together with Mossadeq ended the process that would bring a more representative form
of government for the people and the Iranian independence from foreign dominance
(Gasiorowski 1987, 278). In the eyes of the Iranian people, Mossadeq was a martyr who
reminded the Iranians the Persian empathy for the just ruler and the veneration for Imam
Ali and Hussein who sacrificed themselves for justice and freedom. Ali Ansari states it in
his own words: ―Mossadeq is seen as an opportunity lost and an icon to be lamented‖
(Ansari 2006, 38). However, the foreign intervention would not end here. In 1980, a
brutal attack was launched against Iran from its neighbor Iraq. A bloody war started.
The Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) can be considered one of the longest and the
bloodiest wars in the history of the modern Iran. For some scholars, the war was the latest
manifestation of the Arab-Persian struggle for the domination of the Gulf region. For
some others, the war was just the extension of the historic struggle for power between the
Sunni (Iraq) and Shi‘a Islam (Iran). And for many others, the Iran-Iraq War was a
struggle for power and the domination of the regional politics, following the decline of
the Iranian hegemony and the Saddam‘s quest to become the new ―policeman of the
region‖. The war started less than six years after Iran and Iraq had signed what is called
The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an agreement to settle the borders dispute and to stop
interference in internal affairs of each country. One main dispute involved the issue of the
oil-rich and multi-ethnic province of Khuzestan, which borders Iraq. Due to the Arab (or
non-Persian) majority of the province, Iraq claimed the historical right to control it. The
disputes also involved Iraq‘s claim about several small islands in the Persian Gulf that

22

were occupied by the Iranian military. Moreover, the Shatt al-Arab waterway was
another territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran. Due to Iraq‘s very limited access to the
Persian Gulf, the control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway would become an economic and
strategic gain for Iraq. Parties signed the Algiers Agreement under the promise to

permanently stop the disputes and to restore good relationship and mutual cooperation. It
is important to mention that this treaty did not incorporate an escape clause that would
enable one party to deflect for certain reasons.
However, the situation in the region changed rapidly and radically after the
triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the growing hostility between the new
Islamic government and the United States, especially after the Islamic conquest of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran. For Iraq, the revolution could expand its impact in other regions
of the Persian Gulf and a potential Islamic Shi‘a movement would be a serious threat to
the Iraqi regime. In addition to his desire to become hegemony, the Iraqi leader, Saddam
Hussein, considered Iran an easy target due to the vulnerability created internally by the
revolution. This perception was strengthened by the assumption that by losing the
American support, Iran had lost the political and military support from the West. Saddam
decided to take advantage of the new opportunities. On September 22, 1980, Iraq
launched a massive attack on Iran. In response to the invasion, the Islamic government of
Iran mobilized the regular army, the Pasdaran, and Basij volunteers, including young
boys and girls.
Meanwhile, the Islamic government in Iran was going through radical processes
of change and consolidation. The war also consolidated the popular support for the
Supreme Leader and his government. By the 1982, after Bani Sadr was forced out of the
office and Mujahedin-e Khalq-e Iran organization was almost entirely destroyed, the war
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began to take a different course. Once in defense, now Iran became an offensive force.
The 1982 counteroffensive forced Saddam to retreat from the occupied territories. After
this, the Iranians intensified their war goals by demanding the removal of Saddam from
power and a huge amount in reparations (Axworthy 2008, 268). The Iranians also
rejected a peace plan proposed by the Arab League which demanded an immediate ceasefire, total withdrawal of the Iraqi army, and a $70 billion in reparation for Iran through
the Islamic Reconstruction Bank (Milani 1994, 209).
Despite the international indifference toward this conflict, certain foreign powers
secretly engaged in conflict by providing weaponry assistance to countries at war.
Throughout the war, the United States provided military assistance to both sides,
depending on the course of the war. Once the Americans realized that Iran was gaining
strength, they immediately launched an anti-Iran strategy. This strategy consisted of
supporting Iraq both directly and indirectly, financially and militarily. In 1982, the U.S.
State Department removed Saddam from the department‘s list of ―sponsors of terrorism‖,
and in 1984, diplomatic relations with Baghdad were established. Also, in 1984, the
Reagan administration launched the Operation Staunch, which aimed at stopping the
flow of arms to Iran. Iraq soon became the largest importer of weapons in the region. The
Soviets became the main providers of arms to Iraq. The West Germany also assisted Iraq
in building chemical and biological weapons, which were used later by Saddam against
the Kurds and the Iranians. France provided Iraq with aircraft and long-range bombers.
The Iran-Iraq war became a concern when Iraq began the tanker war. The tanker war
consisted of attacks on oil-transporting ships in the Persian Gulf. This type of war
endangered the U.S. interests in the Gulf. The U.S. navy soon became involved in this
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type of war by supporting the Iraqis and attacking the Iranian navy. This culminated with
the USS Vincennes downing an Iranian commercial aircraft, killing all its 290 people on
board.
Interim, in November 1986, a Lebanese newspaper revealed that the United
States, through Israel, was providing weapons to Iran. This became known as the IranContra Affair (analyzed below as a case study). Due to its desperate need for weapons to
stop Iraq, Iran was willing to buy weapons from everyone, including The Great Satan.
Many believed that Israel was supporting Iran with weapons since the beginning of the
war. The rationale behind this action was Israel‘s strategy to prolong the conflict, causing
severe mutual destruction of both parties in the conflict, and provide military assistance
to the anti-Khomeini groups in order to overthrow the theocratic regime in Iran. The U.S.
officials also claimed that this affair was used to provide military support for groups
within Iran that were willing to overthrow the regime. Major reasons for the U.S.
involvement in this matter were the release of the American hostages held by Shi‘a rebels
in Lebanon and the need for monetary support for the Contras in Latin America. Facing
the international isolation, unable to gather international support to condemn the
Saddam‘s atrocities and the Vincennes incident, and succumbing to the argument of the
Majles Speaker, Akbar Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, that ―the United States would never
allow Iran to succeed in the war‖, the Supreme leader decided to allow President
Khamenei announce the acceptance of the UN Resolution 598, which called for a ceasefire (Axworthy 2008, 269). Both countries accepted the resolution.
Thus, again, Iran survived and raised above all these existential threats the same
way and with the same strength as it did previously from the Greek, Arab, British, and
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Soviet threats. In the words of Sandra Mackey, ―what matters is the Iranian perception
that they, as people, must always live with the terrible threat of outsiders who have so
often plundered and debilitated the Iranian nation‖ (1996, 71).
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Chapter Three
The Islamic Revolution of 1979
Major Factors Leading to the Revolution
The Islamic Revolution of 1979 remains a crucial moment in the history of the
modern Iran. Unlike what many would claim, the revolution was not a surprise to the
Iranian people and to those who were familiar with Iran‘s social and political history. The
revolution was a result of an overwhelming pressure and anger accumulated in decades in
almost all the fields of the Iranian society—social, economic, and political. Ervand
Abrahimian summarizes the sources of the pressure and anger against the Mohammad
Reza Shah Pahlavi as follows:
―In an age of republicanism, he flaunted monarchism, shahism, and
Pahlavism. In an age of nationalism and anti-imperialism, he came to
power as a direct result of the CIA-M16 overthrow of Mossadeq—the idol
of Iranian nationalism. In an age of neutralism, he mocked non-alignment
and Third Worldism. Instead he appointed himself America‟s policeman in
the Persian Gulf, and openly sided with the USA on such sensitive issues
as Palestine and Vietnam. And in an age of democracy, he waxed eloquent
on the virtues of order, discipline, guidance, kingship, and his personal
communication with God.‖ (Abrahamian 2008, 156)
Besides the 1953 coup d‘état against Mossadeq (analyzed previously), there are
several events and factors that explain why the revolution and its triumph was not a
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surprise. The first main event was the Constitutional Movement of 1906. This movement
was a result of the discontent of the people toward the interference and domination from
foreign countries like Russia and Great Britain and the need to establish e democratic
form of government. These two main sources of the discontent became the main
objectives of the Constitutional Movement, which incorporated merchants, secular
reformers, and Shi‘a ulama (Milani 1994, 28). On August 5, 1906, Mozaffar ad-Din Shah
signed the royal proclamation ordering the creation of the Majles and vested its deputies
with the duty of drafting the Constitution. Soon, the Constitution was drafted and came
into effect immediately after the Shah signed it on December 30, 1906. One of the most
controversial articles of the new constitution was the Article 2, which limited the power
of the people (given through Majles) by creating a committee of five ulama who had the
power to veto any Majles legislation that was considered being against the Islamic law.
However, the Constitutional Movement was defeated due to the conflict between the
secular reformers and ulama and the foreign intervention in Iran‘s internal affairs.
Despite the defeat, the Constitutional Movement succeeded in legitimizing elections,
reducing the power of the Shah and its perceptiveness, and granting to the people rights
and powers they had not had before (1994, 31).
Another main event that produced more anger and pressure toward the Shah‘s
regime was what is known as the White Revolution, or The Revolution of the Shah and
the People. The White Revolution incorporated (1) land reform, (2) sale of the stateowned factories to the public, (3) women‘s suffrage, (4) nationalization of forests, (5)
creation of a national literacy corps, and (6) the workers‘ profit-sharing plan (Keddie
2003, 145; Milani 1994, 46). These reforms ignited anger among two main social groups,
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the landlords and the ulama. The land reform severely limited the political power of the
landed upper class and provided the government with absolute authority. Due to this
reform, many peasants became landless and migrated to large cities, where they became a
main source for the army of the Islamic Revolution (Milani 1994, 47). The land reform
also promoted opposition from ulama because of the fact that the reform dealt also with
vaqf holdings (land for charitable purposes), resulting in drastically reducing the revenue
of the ulama.
In opposition to Shah‘s White Revolution, ulama organized what is known as the
June Uprising of the 1963. Among other ulama were Grand Ayatollahs Rohullah
Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Golpayegani, Ayatollah Najafi Mar‘ashi, and Hojatoislam
Hussein Ali Montazeri. The land reform, women‘s suffrage and the de facto recognition
of the state of Israel served as causes for ulama to unite against the Shah. This was the
opportune moment for Khomeini to emerge as a religious and political leader. Khomeini
became the most aggressive and popular opponent of the Shah. In early 1963, Khomeini
began to preach against the Shah in Faiziyeh, a madrasa of Qom. In March of the same
year, the madrasa was attacked by militia and the SAVAK forces, killing a number of
students and arresting Khomeini (Keddie, 2003, p. 147). Immediately after his release,
Khomeini continued his attack on the Shah and his pro-American policy. He was arrested
again on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, after delivering a speech
comparing the Shah to Yazid I, the caliph who had martyred Imam Hussein at the Battle
of Karbala (Gonzales 2007, 55). This governmental action promoted abrupt and fierce
demonstrations in the major cities of Iran, demanding for Khomeini‘s release and
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declaring Holy War against the Shah. Soon, the June Uprising was suppressed and
Khomeini was sent to exile.
However, the vivid memories of the Constitutional Movement, the 1953 coup
d‘état against Mossadeq, and the June Uprising would not have a definitive impact on
overthrowing the Shah without the existence of what Samuel P. Huntington (1968)
considers the gap theory, similar to what Ted Robert Gurr considers relative deprivation
(1970). Huntington argues that modernization is a multifaceted process involving a
fundamental shift in values, attitudes, and expectations (Huntington 1968, 32).
Huntington defines the impact of modernization as follow:
―At the intellectual level, modernization involves the tremendous
expansion of man‟s knowledge about his environment and the diffusion of his
knowledge throughout society through increased literacy, mass
communication, and education. Demographically, modernization means
changes in the pattern of life…Socially, modernization tends to supplement
the family and other primary groups having diffuse roles with consciously
organized secondary association having much more specific
functions…Economically, there is a diversification of activity as a few simple
occupations give way to many complex ones…‖ (1968, 32-33)
According to Huntington, social mobilization and the economic development are
the main aspects of modernization related to politics. Social mobilization increases the
aspiration and expectations. The economic development increases the capacity of a
society to satisfy those aspirations and expectations. However, a gap develops between
the aspirations and expectations and the capacity to fulfill those aspirations and
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expectations. This situation generates social frustration, dissatisfaction, and political
instability (1968, 54). Iran was under the same conditions.
Under the leadership of the Shah and his reforms for modernization, Iran
witnessed a rapid economic development. During his last two decades of reign, the Shah
was interested in modernizing Iran‘s economy and society and giving Iran a Western
character and a modernized military (Keddie 2003, 133). This was made possible also by
the high oil revenue entering in government‘s budget. In addition, this modernization
process promoted by the Shah resulted in a high rate of social mobilization of the Iranian
people. Dr. Mohsen M. Milani uses the gap theory to explain how the rapid
socioeconomic development and the lack of an institutional building process created the
gap that would set the stage for the Revolution to start. For Milani, the socioeconomic
development increases social mobilization and the demand for political participation by
various groups. And as he indicates, ―To deny participation to those who desire to
become involved in politics is to create the fertile ground from which a revolution
grows.‖ (1994, 15).
Nevertheless, this alone cannot be sufficient to start the revolution without the
presence of what Milani calls the perception by the people of the ―support linkage‖
between Iran and the United States and the indecisiveness of the Shah to act (1994, 16).
The American support, the rapid economic expansion, and the repression were three main
factors that helped the Shah retain power. There existed a perception from the Iranian
people that the American support for Shah‘s regime had weakened. The human rights
policy promoted by the Carter administration and Shah‘s liberalization reform of 1977
severely aggravated Shah‘s political situation. Being denounced by the United Nations
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and the Amnesty International for severe violation of the human rights, the American
human rights policy was perceived by the Iranian people as a pressure toward Shah to
reform the political system. This situation was exacerbated by the inconsistent American
policy toward Iran, which was a result of the radical split within the Carter
administration. In the eyes of the Iranian people, the U.S. weakening support for the Shah
was tantamount to losing the source of power to survive. To make the matter worse,
Shah‘s liberalization reform allowed political and social groups to organize their antiShah movement. In addition, the Shah was known for his indecisiveness and the ability to
use violence ―at the right time‖ and direct it toward ―the right group‖ (1994, 128). To all
these can be added the fact that the Shah was suffering from an incurable disease, which
might have influenced his decision-making ability. Marxist, nationalist, and other social
groups took advantage of this situation by implementing their own agendas and
strategies.
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Main Political and Social Groups
This situation led many social and political groups to organize and challenge the
regime. One main political group included the Marxist organizations such as the Tudeh
Party and the Fada‟iyun-e Khalq. The Tudeh Party became an influential political actor
after the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia in 1917. However, its force and reputation
started to fade after the alleged conspiracies that this party planned against Mossadeq
during the 1953 coup d‘état. The Fada‟iyun-e Khalq also did not have any better history
than the Tudeh Party. They both ended up losing their leaders and supporters in
confronting the Shah. Another important political group included the National Front.
National Front was a very popular secular nationalist organization. However, after the
1953 coup d‘état and the imprisonment of its historic leader Mahmud Mossadeq, the
organization was severely damaged by conflicts between its members and the systematic
persecution and executions of its members conducted by the SAVAK forces. Shah
considered the National Front as the primary threat to his regime.
In addition to the political organizations, the anti-Shah movement included
several social groups. One main social group was what was called the Cultural
Revivalism group, comprising prominent intellectuals whose work aimed at portraying
Shah‘s regime as unjust and illegitimate. This group of scholars included Seyyed
Fakhreddin Shadman Valavi, Samad Behrangi, Mehdi Bazargan, Al-e Ahmad, and Ali
Shari‘ati. Shadman was a Huntington of his time because he emphasized the threat that
the Western civilization posed to the existence of the Iranian culture and identity.
Behrangi was considered a ―secular leftist‖ who mocked the like-Western behavior of the
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Iranian bourgeoisie and condemned the American influence in the Iranian education
system (Hanson 1983, 1).
Al-e Ahmad was also an anti-Western, but his views were focused more on the
West as an imperialist power, an indication of his past membership in the Tudeh Party. In
addition, Bazargan focused himself on the internal conditions of Iran as the main causes
of despotism and proposed the creation of an Islamic government run by experts who
were also devoted Shi‘as (Milani 1994, 80). Like Bazargan, Shari‘ati was concerned
about the intrusion of the Western values and ideas in the Iranian culture and the threat
that it represented to Shi‘a religion in Iran. He argued that ulama had failed to spread the
ideas and teachings of the true Shi‘ism, which he called Alavi Shi‟ism. As a staunch
opponent of the regime, Shari‘iati was banned from lecturing and put under SAVAK
surveillance. He died in London in 1977, without having the opportunity to witness the
revolution he had lectured about.
Moreover, the Mojahedin-e Khalq-e Iran was another major component of the
Islamic Revolution of 1979. The organization was founded in 1965 and is considered by
some scholars as ―the first Iranian organization to develop systematically a modern
revolutionary interpretation of Islam‖ (as cited in Boroujerdi 1996, 116). The
organization emphasized and supported ideas expressed from Bazargan and Ali Shari‘ati
with regard to the Western threat to Iran and Islam. The majority of its members and
supporters came from the traditional and bazaar classes. The major source of support and
recruitments was also concentrated in universities. The ideology of Mojahedin-e Khalq-e
Iran was based on two major characteristics of the Iranian thoughts at that time:
nationalism and populism. As such, they considered themselves ―inheritors‖ of the
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legacies of the constitutional movement of the early 1900s, of the movement of Mirza
Kucheck-Khan, and of the nationalist movement of the 1950 led by Mahmud Mossadeq
(1996, 117). The Mojahedins proclaimed Islam to be the sole ideology capable of
mobilizing all the parts of the Iranian society in confronting the Western dominance.
Inspired by the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba, the Mojahedins believed in the need for
armed struggle against the current regime as the most efficient strategy. They emphasized
the concepts of resistance, martyrdom, revolution, and a classless society (Boroujerdi
1996, 117). However, in 1975 and on, many members of the Mujahedin organization
were converted to Marxism. From the middle of 1975 to 1979, the organization was
divided in two major and antagonistic groups—Islamic and Marxist. As a result, the
Mojahedins not only lost their power in confronting Shah‘s regime, but they also lost the
public support.
Finally, Shi‘a ulama are considered lawyers who interpret and expand on religious
law. They subscribe their role to the spiritual, social, and the political needs of their
community. Shi‘a ulama are educated at seminaries of Najaf in Iraq and Qom in Iran. In
seminaries, students are prepared to reach a high level of proficiency in law,
jurisprudence, theology, philosophy, logic, rhetoric, and literature. At the top of the Shi‘a
hierarchy are the most senior clergy, who are called sources of emulation (marja‟altaqlid). Every Shi‘a follows one marja‟. The rank of a Shi‘a cleric is determined by the
profile of his mentor, the role of the mentor in student‘s formation, the quality of his
publications, and the amount of the religious taxes and donations that the believer gives
to the mentor for charitable purposes (Nasr, 2007, pp. 70-71). Besides Grand Ayatollah
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Muhammad Husain Boroujerdi, many argue, there has never been any universally
accepted supreme ayatollah or source of emulation.
Among the most influential ulama that worked for the Islamic Revolution were
Grand Ayatollahs Rohullah Khomeini, Shariatmadari, Ayatollahs Mahmud Taleqani,
Najafi Mar‘ashi, and Hojatoislam Hussein Ali Montazeri. The revolution brought to an
end the Safavid Contract, which stated that ―Shi‘a ulama would not recognize the Safavid
monarchy as truly legitimate but would bless it as the most desirable form of government
during the period of waiting.‖ (2007, 74). The Safavid Contract was replaced by the
Khomeini‘s doctrine of velayat-e faqih, which rendered Shi‘ism and Islam incompatible
with monarchy and advocated the direct ruling by ulama.
Despite the controversies among high-ranking clergy, ulama managed to succeed
over other coalition forces of the revolution. There are several reasons why ulama
succeeded. First, Shi‘ism became the leading ideology of the revolution and justified the
struggle against the Shah. Ulama were the source of this ideology that appealed
legitimacy. Second, unlike other groups, ulama had significant financial resources
coming from donations and charities. Third, due to their nature and activity, ulama were
able to organize masses through Mosques. Because of the very organized nature of
Shi‘ism, ulama managed to create a nation-wide organization of the masses. Fourth,
ulama had a very charismatic and skillful leader like Ayatollah Khomeini. Fifth,
Khomeini‘s supporters were trustful and adamant. Sixth, ulama were supported by lower
classes people who had nothing to lose. Lastly, Khomeini was skillful and able enough to
build parallel institutions to those of the old institutions—building ―a state within the
state‖. While Khomeini kept the old institutions, he also built parallel institutions like the
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Islamic Republican Party (parliament), the Revolutionary Guard (national army), the
Komites (local police), the Revolutionary Courts (judiciary), etc.
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Chapter Four
Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini and the Velayat-e Faqif Doctrine
Khomeini‟s Life
Ayatollah Rohulla Khomeini was born in September 24th, 1902 in a family of
seyyed (descendants of the Prophet). The title Ayatollah (the Sign of God) was given to
Khomeini based on his education credentials as prescribed under the Shi‘a Islamic
tradition. Many believe that the life of Ayatollah Khomeini has gone through three
different phases. The first phase, from 1908 to 1962, was characterized by training,
teaching, and writing in the field of Islamic studies. At the age of six he began to study
the Koran and elementary Persian. Later, he completed his studies in Islamic law, ethics,
and spiritual philosophy under the supervision of Ayatollah Abdul Karim Haeri-ye Yazdi
in Qom. During this scholarly phase of his life, Khomeini did not participate in political
activities. However, his studies, teachings, and writings indicate that he firmly believed
that leadership of political activities should be in the hands of the most prominent
members of the Shi‘a ulama.
The second phase of Khomeini's life, from 1962 to 1979, was characterized by
highly political activism, which was influenced by his strict, religious interpretation of
Shi‘a Islam. He started his struggle against the Shah's regime in 1962, which led to the
outbreak of a religious and political rebellion on June 5, 1963. This date can be regarded
as a turning point in the history of the Islamic movement in Iran and as a pivotal moment
that crystallized the religious and political profile of Khomeini. As analyzed previously,
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Khomeini became the most aggressive and popular opponent of the Shah. In early 1963,
Khomeini began to preach against the Shah in Faiziyeh, a madrasa of Qom. In March of
the same year, the madrasa was attacked by militia and the SAVAK forces, killing a
number of students and arresting Khomeini (Keddie 2003, 147). Immediately after his
release, Khomeini continued his attack on the Shah and his pro-American policy. He was
arrested again on the anniversary of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, after delivering a
speech comparing the Shah to Yazid, the caliph who had martyred Imam Hussein at the
Battle of Karbala (Gonzales 2007, 55). This governmental action promoted abrupt and
fierce demonstrations in the major cities of Iran, demanding for Khomeini‘s release and
declaring Holy War against the Shah. The Shah brutally crushed the uprising and exiled
Khomeini in 1964. Khomeini first resided in Iraq and then he moved to France where he
stood until the outbreak of the Islamic Revolution. However, regardless of the failure of
the uprising, it was during this time that Khomeini received the title of Marja-e Talqid,
giving him a very distinguished position among clergy and superior credentials in Iran‘s
political life.
The third phase of Khomeini's life begins with his return from exile on February
1st, 1979, just two weeks after Muhammad Reza Shah had been forced out of Iran. On
February 11th, revolutionary forces loyal to Khomeini seized power in Iran, and
Khomeini emerged as the founder and the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic of
Iran. Khomeini succeeded in building a new theocratic state of Iran as he envisioned in
his doctrine of velayat-e faqih.
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Velayat-e Faqih Doctrine
The velayat-e faqih doctrine is the essence of Khomeini‘s vision about the Islamic
government and the framework that would set the stage for Khomeini to attain the
leadership of the Islamic Republic. This doctrine has its roots in Shi'a Islam notion of the
guardianship of jurisprudence—vehemently espoused by Khomeini and opposed by
some—which gives the faqih (the jurist) the power to decide on state and religious
matters (Enayat 1983, 170). Khomeini envisioned a modern government that would
resemble the theocratic Muslim community of the early years of Islam in which ulama
possessed the legitimate power over the people, given to them directly by the Prophet
Mohammad through the Imams. Khomeini also based his doctrine on the Kur'anic
principle that Imams have the divine power to explain the Islamic laws and rules and
provide them to the people in a simplistic and understandable manner. Khomeini's
doctrine assumed its legitimacy on his explanation of Kur'anic saying: "O you believers,
obey God, obey the prophet and obey those in charge among you." (Shevlin 2000, 365).
In his book Islamic Government: Governance of the Jurist, translated by Hamid
Algar, Khomeini emphasizes the need for an Islamic government and laid down its main
principles. Khomeini believes that it is the duty of all true Muslims not only to pray but
also to act to defend Islam from the internal corruption and the external threats. This is to
follow the path of the Prophet Muhammad who led Muslims both religiously and
politically. Khomeini presents five main reasons for creating an Islamic government:
1. To support the rights of the weak from the oppressing ruling class;
2. To avoid corruption and the rule by minority;
3. To preserve the Islamic order and make individuals pursue the Islamic path;
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4. To prevent the approval of anti-Islamic laws by sham parliaments; and
5. To destroy the influence and the domination of the foreign powers in Islamic
lands. (Khomeini n.d., 27-28)
Khomeini argued that it is self-evident that the Muslim community needed
―righteous and proper organs of government‖. The Islamic government that he envisioned
comprises three main branches: legislative, executive, and administrative. Even though
Khomeini did not mention the judicial branch, he pays special attention to the
adjudication process for civil and penal matters and considers the faqih both a judge and
an executor. Khomeini argues that the legislative power and the competence to formulate
laws belong exclusively to God. He believes that law alone rules over society and that the
government should be a government of the law. The law should be considered as ―a tool
or an instrument for the establishment of justice in society, a mean for man‘s intellectual
and moral reform and his purification‖ (n.d., 47).
However, the controversy begins with Khomeini‘s claim about the ruler and his
religious credentials. Seeing that the government would be a government of law,
Khomeini claims that the ruler should be a faqih—an expert in Islamic jurisprudence. He
also argues that being a faqih should be e requirement for all those who hold
governmental positions. The faqih must surpass other fuqaha (plural for faqih) in
knowledge. Khomeini summarizes the credentials of the faqih in three main points: (1) to
be an expert in Islamic jurisprudence, (2) to have the sense of leadership, and (3) to be a
just ruler (n.d., p. 49). Moreover, as mentioned above, Khomeini believes that the ruling
by a faqih and the obedience to those entrusted with authority is justified in Ku‘ran‘s
verses: ―…And obey the holders of authority from among you‖ (as cited in Khomeini
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n.d., 30).
Khomeini also argues that fuqaha are the ―heirs of the prophets‖ and fight in
―God‘s way to implement laws of Islam and establish its social system‖ (n.d., 94). By
following this explanation, Khomeini claims that there is no difference between the faqih,
the Most Noble Messenger (Prophet Muhammad), and the Commander of the Faithful
(Imam Ali) because the ruler has the duty to implement the laws of God. However, the
faqih does not have absolute authority over other fuqaha and cannot appoint or dismiss
them. Despite the opposition from the majority of prestigious Shi‟a ulama, Khomeini
established his doctrine of velayat-e faqih and assumed the role of the faqih soon after the
triumph of the Islamic Revolution and the adaptation of the Islamic Constitution after the
referendum of December 2nd and 3rd, 1979.
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Chapter Five
The Islamic Constitution and Iran‘s Power Structure
The Islamic Constitution
Having proclaimed and established Shi'ism as the ideology of the revolution and
succeeded in overthrowing the Shah, Khomeini moved on to realize his dream of creating
the Islamic State of Iran based on his doctrine of velayat-e faqih. After debates with other
coalition members (especially with the provisional Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan)
about the name of the new state, in the referendum of March 30th and 31st of 1980,
Iranians voted overwhelmingly to build an Islamic Republic (Taylor & Francis Group and
Dean 2004, 368). The Islamic Republic was the only form of government to appear on
the ballot, and votes were not cast in secret. An overwhelming majority of over 98
percent voted in favor of an Islamic Republic. Khomeini proclaimed the establishment of
the Islamic Republic of Iran on May 1, 1979, when he ―declared the first day of the
Government of Allah on the earth‖ (Milani 1994, 154).
The name given to the new Islamic Republic comprises two meaningful concepts—
(1) Islamic and (2) Republic. However, some argue that both these concepts are
incongruous to each other, at least from the religious perspective. Abdelwahab Hechiche
cites Professor Tibi when he states that:
―the term 'Islamic Republic' betrays the character of contemporary Islam: It is
a defensive culture. A 'Republic' is a European form of government and is
identical neither to the Sunni Islamic Caliphate nor to Shi'i Islamic Immamate.
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This concept cannot be found in the dogmatic Islamic sources.‖ (as cited in
Hechiche 2002, 192)
In addition, Askari defines some major problems the notion of the Islamic State.
He argues that there are three main issues when dealing with the notion of the Islamic
State:
1. In a theocratic state, sovereignty lies with God.
2. Sharia is a criterion for an Islamic State.
3. The problematic issue concerning the very concept of state.
Askari argues that ―sovereignty is a concept which has its proper place in
particular discourse—political science (as cited in Hechiche 2002, 184). He also claims
that sovereignty cannot be used in the political sense for three main reasons:
1. It limits God and reduces His transcendence.
2. It is a violation of the scriptural usage for reasons both earthly and heavenly—
nothing is outside God's dominance and power.
3. God cannot be identified with one particular social and historical institution. This
can reduce Him to a deity. (2002, 184)
Despite this issue, the most important task after the victory of the revolution was
the drafting of the new constitution that would solidify the structure of the Islamic State.
Through the new constitution, Khomeini aimed at institutionalizing his doctrine of
velayat-e faqih. For this purpose, in August of the same year, Iran held election to elect
73 member of the Majles-e Khebregan (Assembly of Experts), whose primary task was
drafting the constitution. Khomeini‘s supporters achieved a landslide victory. The
drafting of the constitution created two main opposing groups. On one hand, there were

44

Bazargan and his supporters who supported a constitution modeled after the Charles de
Gaulle‟s Fifth Republic and envisioned ―a republic that would be Islamic in name but
more democratic in content‖ (Abrahamian 2008, 162). The draft proposed by Bazargan
was similar to the 1906 Constitution and provided ulama with a little power in state
matters. On the other hand, there were Khomeini and his disciples who envisioned a
constitution based on the velayat-e faqih doctrine, with ulama dominating and having
ultimate decision-making power over the state matters.
The conflict between these two main opposing groups was also an indication of
the existence of a dual government. One government was led by Bazargan and comprised
the old political institutions, and the other government was led by Khomeini and
comprised a set of parallel institutions created by him, which include the Revolutionary
Council and the Central Komiteh to oversee the performance of the provisional
government, the Islamic Republican Party (parliament), the Revolutionary Guard
(national army), the Komites (local police), and the Revolutionary Courts (judiciary). The
result of this situation was a constitutional draft ―hybrid—albeit weighted heavily in
favor of one—between Khomeini‘s velayat-e faqih and Bazargan‘s French Republic;
between divine rights and the rights of man; between theocracy and democracy; between
vox dei and vox populi; and between clerical authority and popular sovereignty‖ (2008,
163-164). The Assembly of Experts for Constitution finished the draft on November 15,
and the Islamic Constitution was adopted through a national referendum on December 2nd
and 3rd, 1979.
The Constitution was amended in 1989 to cope with the new reality facing the
Iranian politics—―the transition from the consolidation phase to the reconstruction phase

45

of the Islamic Revolution and the emergence of state as the central player on the Iranian
political scene‖ (Milani 1994, 225). The election of Khomeini's successor and the
demand for a stronger and effective executive branch of the government urged the
Assembly for Reconsideration of Constitution (ad hoc Assembly formed by Khomeini to
review the Constitution), under Khomeini's previous directives, to remove marjaeyat
clause and to centralize the executive. The removal of the marjaeyat clause made it
possible for Khomeini's successor to assume the position of the Supreme Leader based on
a new (lower) set of religious requirements (1994, 221-222). The centralization of the
executive branch consisted on the constitutional removal of the office of the prime
minister and transferring of all its powers to the office of the President (analyzed below).
However, this change did not have any significant impact on Iran‘s power structure.
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Iran‟s Power Structure
The political system of the Islamic Iran has a fairly complicated power structure.
Kazem Alamdari (2005, 1299) claims:
“the political structure of the IRI is not constructed like a canopy, in which
removing the central pole causes its collapse; rather, it is built on many
independent, rival, parallel columns of power that hold the system together. In
the case of a sudden collapse of the IRI, a civil war and partition of the Iranian
territory is highly probable”.
The political system is comprised of the formal power structure and the informal power
structure. The formal power structure is clearly defined under the Islamic Constitution
and is encountered in the structure of state institutions and offices. The formal power
structure encompasses the Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the
President, the Council of Ministers, the Expediency Council, the Majles, the Council of
Guardians, the judiciary, state radio and television, and the armed forces.
The informal power structure consists of religious-political organizations,
revolutionary foundations, and paramilitary organizations supporting factions of Iran‘s
clerical leadership (Buchta 2000, xi). According to Wilfried Buchta (2000, xii)., the
informal structure consists of ―four concentric rings‖ The first ring, the inner, comprises
the most powerful clerics in the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the
government. The second ring comprises ―the most senior nonclerical governmental
functionaries and administrators‖. The third ring consists of the power base of the regime,
the members of the revolutionary organizations, the pasdaran and Basij militia,
revolutionary committees, religious security forces, and media. The forth ring
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encompasses former influential individuals and groups that serve as interlocutor between
the civil society and the regime and seek to promote peaceful reforms from within the
system.
The Supreme Leader, the President, the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the
Majles, the Council of Guardians, and the Expediency Council are the most important
institutions of the Islamic Republic of Iran. An analysis of these major institutions will
help us determine how the power is distributed and where the real power rests. However,
this does not mean that other state (i.e. armed forces and media) and non-state institutions
(i.e. Teachers of Qom Theological Colleges) are not important. This is to reveal which
institution(s) bears the dominant power to influence the political decision-making
process, both domestically and internationally.
The Supreme Leader is the most influential institution and exerts his power over
almost every political and social institution. No major decision can be made and no
policy can be implemented without the approval of the Supreme Leader (Sadjadpour
2008). The Chapter VIII of the Islamic constitution deals with qualification and powers
of the Supreme Leader. Qualifications of the Supreme Leader are elaborated in
Khomeini‘s doctrine of velayat-e faqih, as analyzed previously. The Article 110 provides
the Supreme Leader with the authority and the rights to exert power as follow:
1. Delineation of the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran after
consultation with the Nation's Exigency Council.
2. Supervision over the proper execution of the general policies of the system.
3. Issuing decrees for national referenda.
4. Assuming supreme command of the Armed Forces
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5. Declaration of war and peace and the mobilization of the Armed Forces
6. Appointment, dismissal, and resignation of:
a. the religious men on the Guardian Council,
b. the supreme judicial authority of the country,
c. the head of the radio and television network of the Islamic Republic of Iran,
d. the chief of the joint staff,
e. the chief commander of the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, and
f. the supreme commanders of the Armed Forces.
7. Resolving differences between the three wings of the Armed Forces and
regulation of their relations.
8. Resolving the problems which cannot be solved by conventional methods,
through the Nation's Exigency Council.
9. Signing the decree formalizing the election of the President of the Republic by
the people. The suitability of candidates for the Presidency of the Republic,
with respect to the qualifications specified in the Constitution, must be
confirmed before elections take place by the Guardian Council, and, in the
case of the first term of a President, by the Leadership.
10. Dismissal of the President of the Republic, with due regard for the interests of
the country, after the Supreme Court holds him guilty of the violation of his
constitutional duties, or after a vote of the Islamic Consultative Assembly
testifying to his incompetence on the basis of the Article 89.
11. Pardoning or reducing the sentences of convicts, within the framework of
Islamic criteria, on a recommendation from the Head of judicial power.
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In addition, the Leader exerts his power through the Office of the Supreme Leader.
The main task of this office is to organize and manage the Leader‘s agenda and to keep
him informed with all the internal and external political development. This office consists
of four permanent members, all of whom are high-ranking clerics and the most trustful
collaborators of the Leader. Moreover, the Leader exercises direct power over the other
institutions through the nemayandeha-ye rahbar (representatives of the supreme leader).
The representatives are closely connected to the Office of the Supreme Leader and are
appointed in person by the Leader. Almost all of them are clerics, and the majority of
them holds the rank of hojjatoeslam (proof of Islam). The representatives make it
possible for the Leader to exercise his power in five major areas of the Iranian politics, as
cited by Wilfried Buchta (2000, 48):
1. Ministries in the executive branch;
2. The armed forces and security services;
3. Provincial representatives (Friday imams);
4. Revolutionary and religious organizations; and
5. Iranian cultural centers in foreign countries
The Assembly of Experts for Leadership is the only institution that has the power
to elect the Faqih and dismiss him when the later is deemed incapable of fulfilling its
constitutional duties. Its powers are defined under the Article 107 and are exercised in
accordance with the Article 111. It has the power to appoint and supervise Faqih's
performance, to make sure that the performance complies with the Islamic ideology, and
that Faqih is capable to perform his duties. Under the Article 108, the Faqih and religious
members have the power to appoint the members of the Assembly. Their power is given
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under the Charter VIII, the Articles 107-111 of the Iranian Islamic constitution. The
Assembly consists of eighty-six clerics elected by the popular vote to eight-year terms.
Any candidate for election to the assembly should pass the criteria established by the
Assembly of Experts and must take the approval of the Council of Guardians. If the
assembly dismisses the Faqih, than a leadership council composed of the President, the
head of the judiciary, and a faqih from the Council of Guardians assume the duties of the
Leader (2000, 60).
In addition to Iran‘s formal power structure, the President is considered the
second highest leader of the Islamic Republic. Together with the legislative and the
executive branches of the government, the President constitutes the democratic element
of the Islamic Constitution. The Article 56 provides the men with the divine right to
govern themselves. The Article 57 articulates the separation of powers in three branches
of the government—executive, legislative, and judicial—all of which functioning under
the supervision of ―the absolute religious Leader and the Leadership of the Umma‖.
In addition, the powers and responsibilities of the office of the President are
enumerated under the Chapter IX, Section 1 and 2, the Articles 113-142. The Article 113
states that after the office of Leadership (the Leader), the President is the highest official
of the state. The President has the responsibility for implementing the constitution and
acting as the head of the executive, except in matters directly concerned with the office of
the Leader. The President is elected for a four-year term by the direct vote of the people
and is allowed to serve no more than two terms in office. The President can be removed
by two-thirds of majority vote of no-confidence in the Parliament. The Majles declare the
President incompetent and inform the Supreme Leader to dismiss the President in
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accordance with the Article 110 of the Constitution. His main rights and powers include
(2000, 23):
1. To select the first of the four vice presidents;
2. To appoint and dismiss ministers, who should be confirmed by the
Majles (Parliament);
3. To control the sazeman-e barname va bujet (Planning and Budget
Organization);
4. To act as the chairman of the shura-ye amniyat-e melli (National
Security Council); and
5. To manage the personnel composition of the shura-ye „ali-yeenqelab-e
farshangi-ye eslami (Supreme Council of the Islamic Cultural
Revolution).
Despite the prestige, the office of the President does not have influence over the
foreign policy agenda. Even though it is elected by the people, the President should be
confirmed by the Supreme Leader in order to serve in office. In addition, the President
and the entire executive branch of the government are subordinated to the velayat-e faqih
institution. Lastly, and the most important, the President does not have any control over
the armed and security forces. Only the Faqih has authority over all other institutions and
in all the political issues (2000, 23).
Moreover, the Parliament (Majles) represents the legislative body of the Iranian
government, as defined under the Article 58. The parliament bears significant principal
similarities with the parliament coming out of the constitutional movement of 1906.
Members of the parliament are elected every four years through public elections. The
main rights and powers of the Majles include: ―drafting legislation (the Articles 71-75),
ratifying international treaties (the Article 77), approving state-of-emergency declarations
(the Article 79) and loans (the Article 80), examining and approving the annual state
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budget (the Article 52), and, if necessary, removing from the office the state the president
and his appointed ministers‖ (2000, 58). Unlike the Western parliaments, the Majles is
heavily influenced by the clergy rule and domination. The Council of Guardians have
considerable influence over the Majles composition and legislation.
Furthermore, the power structure of Iran encompasses the Council of Guardians.
The Council consists of twelve members and its power is defined under the Article 91 of
the Constitution. The Council has the right and the power to determine whether or not
candidates for in the Executive and Legislative branches of the government are suitable
and competent for their positions. It also determines the compatibility of the legislation
passed by the Majles with Shi‘a Islam. Six members of the council are religious men
selected by the Faqih and other six members are jurists specialized in different areas of
law, who are elected by the Majles from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the head
of the judiciary.
Finally, the Expediency Council is another important element of Iran‘s power
structure. It was created (by Ayatollah Khomeini and being led currently by Ali Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani) to solve cases when there is an impasse within the Council of
Guardians or between the Majles and the Council of Guardians. Its decision is final and
irreversible. The Council receives importance in case of impasse between the Council of
Guardians and the Majles, as was the case in 1988-89. The Council also advises the
Faqih in accordance with the Articles 110 and 112 of the Constitution. Many believe that
the current Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, exercises his authority without consulting
with the Council.

53

Chapter Six
The Theoretical Approach
Offensive Realism
In order for us to maximize our understanding about Iran's security and foreign
policy, we need to rely on a theoretical approach that provides an accurate explanation of
the political phenomena. It is also important to make an analysis of the other theoretical
approaches in order to be able to realize the main differences between theories of
international relations as pertaining to this study. While a theory may provide a better
explanation of the topic compare to the other theories, knowledge about the other theories
may help us discern hidden aspects and perspectives of the issue or phenomena.
As previously stated, the argument of this study is that Iran's security and foreign
policy is mainly based on the principles of the Offensive Realism theory of international
relations, founded and advocated by John Mearsheimer (2001). However, it needs to be
emphasized that this study does not claim or pretend that Offensive Realism explains
everything regarding Iran‘s security and foreign policy. Indeed, the founder of this theory
considers it ―a powerful flashlight in a dark room: even though it cannot illuminate every
nook and cranny, most of the time it is an excellent tool for navigating through the
darkness‖ (2001, 11).
Mearsheimer provides us with five ―bedrock assumptions‖, or principles, of the
offensive realism (2001, 30-31). The first principle of the Offensive Realism is that the
international system has an anarchic status. However, it does not mean that the system is
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chaotic or engulfed by conflicts and wars. The concept of anarchy refers to the notion of
ordering principle of the international system, which considers the states to be sovereign
and obeying to no higher authority. Thus, the state of anarchy means that the international
system lacks a central authority or a supranational government. As Kenneth Waltz
affirms, conflicts and wars happen in an anarchic international system ―because there is
nothing to prevent them‖ (2001, 232).
The second assumption is that great powers possess some offensive military
capabilities that can be used to cause damages or even destroy each other. Based on his
study of the three former European great powers during the last two centuries,
Mearsheimer claims that wealth and the economic status is (but not always) a good
indicator of latent power. He defines ―great powers‖ as states that have sufficient military
potential to engage in conventional war against the most powerful state in the world.
Mearsheimer claims that his theory focuses on great powers because ―the fortunes of all
states—great powers and smaller powers alike—are determined primarily by the
decisions and actions of those with the greatest capability‖ (2001, 5). According to him, a
great power does not need to have capabilities to defeat the most powerful state, but it
should be powerful enough to turn the conflict into a war of attrition that weakens the
leading power, even though the later wins the war (2001, 5). The potential of the threat
depends on the capabilities owned by each state. The most dangerous powers are those
that possess greater military strength.
The third ―bedrock assumption‖ of the Mearsheimer‘s Offensive Realism is that
states are suspicious of other states‘ intentions. States fear each other and believe that
there cannot be any guaranty that states that possess military capabilities would not attack
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other states. There may be many possible causes for confrontation and aggression that
can be used by one state to attack the other. Intentions of the states can change rapidly,
and so do alliances. The security dilemma embracing both the United States and Soviets
during the Cold War is a perfect example and of absence of trust among States and of the
maximization of power relative to the power of the others. Another example is Iraq‘s
aggression toward Iran in 1980. Iraq attacked Iran less than six years after they had
signed in a ―brotherly‖ manner what is called The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an
agreement to settle the borders dispute and to stop interference in internal affairs of each
other. Soon, the aspiration for brotherhood was converted into an ambition for power and
territory. The history of Iran showed us a plethora of cases in which Iran has been
continuously under the threats and aggressions from other states.
The fourth principle holds that the survival is the primary goal of every state.
There is no higher priority for a state than its survival. All the other goals succumb to the
instinct of survival. Mearsheimer argues that states can also pursue non-security goals ―as
long as the requisite behavior does not conflict with the balance-of-power logic‖ (2001,
p. 46). If we had to consider the survival as an ideology, then we would define it as the
only status quo ideology—the ultimate ideology that cannot be changed for or be
subjugated to any other ideology. The invasions from Mongols and Tartars in thirteenth
and fourteenth centuries, among others, remind Iranians of the fact that extermination and
the very existential threats may still be present in today‘s world.
The last ―bedrock assumption‖ of Offensive Realism is that states are rational
actors and behave based on their need to survive and on constraints provided to them by
the international system. Mearsheimer argues that states get involved in game theory
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through which ―they consider the preferences of other states and how their own behavior
is likely to affect the behavior of those other states, and how the behavior of those other
states is likely to affects their own strategy for survival‖ (2001, 31).
However, as Mearsheimer cautions us, none of these five ―bedrock assumptions‖
alone mandates that states behave competitively or aggressively. Taken together, these
assumptions create powerful incentives and motivations for the states to think and act
aggressively toward each others. In an anarchic international system, states realize that in
order for them to survive, they have to account on self-help. The best way for states to
ensure their survival is to become the most powerful state—global hegemony.
Mearsheimer (2001, 35) summarizes this view as follow:
“Given the difficulty of determining how much power is enough for today and
tomorrow, great powers recognize that the best way to ensure their security is to
achieve hegemony now, thus eliminating any possibility of a challenge by
another great power. Only a misguided state would pass up an opportunity to
become hegemony in the system because it thought it already had sufficient
power to survive.”
Thus, being under such conditions, states will never accept the status quo status of
power until they dominate the entire international system. Mearsheimer cites Immanuel
Kant when he says that ―It is the desire of every state, or of its ruler, to arrive at a
condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world, if that were possible‖ (2001,
34). Mearsheimer believes that a global hegemony is not possible and ―the world is
condemned to perpetual great-power competition (2001, 2). He also distinguishes
between the notion of global hegemony and the regional hegemony. The United States is
just a regional hegemony due to the absence of other powers in the Western hemisphere.
In order to be a global hegemony, the United States should be the only power in Asia and
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Europe, which is not the case.
In his theory, John Mearsheimer also argues that there are four main strategies
through which a state can gain power relative to the powers gained from the other states.
First, states gain power by going to war with the other rival states. Second, states gain
power by threatening rival states to use military forces against them--‖blackmail‖. Third,
the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a ―protracted war‖, so that ―they
bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on sideline with its military strength
intact‖ (Mearsheimer, 2001, 147-155). This is the case when one state causes other states
to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be free in the future to expand its
power. The last strategy that states implement to gain power is the bloodletting strategy,
which aims at causing rival states to fight against each other in a long and costing
conflict.
On the other hand, states also aim at preventing other states from gaining power at
their expenses. In order to achieve this goal, states implement two major strategies. The
first strategy is balancing. Through this strategy, a great power ―assumes direct
responsibility‖ to prevent another state from disturbing the current balance of power. The
initial goal is to deter the aggressor. If this part of the strategy fails, then the balancing
state will use its power to prevent the other state from disturbing the balance of power
(2001, 156). The second strategy to prevent other states from gaining power is by using
the buck-passing strategy. The state implementing this strategy attempts to get another
state bear the burden of preventing, confronting, or even fighting against other state that
aims at upsetting the balance of power. This strategy requires high diplomatic
sophistication in order to ―pass the buck‖ to the other state (2001, 157-159).
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Different Theoretical Perspectives
Offensive realism is an alternative theory to the structural realism theory of
Kenneth N. Waltz (1979), also known as defensive realism. Both have their roots from
the classical realism theory. The classical realism theory begins with the Thucydides‘
famous work The Peloponnesian War. Thucydides argues that power politics is a law of
human nature. He maintains that the ―lust for power‖ and the ego to dominate the others
are embedded in the human nature. Thucydides captured the Melian dialogue and defined
it as a perfect example to validate his claims. In addition, Nicolo Machiavelli (1532) is
another classical realist who argued that in the real world principles are subordinated to
policies of the state. Machiavelli emphasized his notion of reason d‟état or reason of
state and argued that ―the ultimate skill of the state leader is to accept, and adapt to, the
changing power political configuration in world politics‖ (Baylis, Smith, and Owens
2008, 96).
In addition to the works and ideas of Thucydides and Machiavelli, Hans
Morgenthau provided the fundamental principles of the classical realism. In his work
Politics Among Nations (Morgenthau and Thomson 1985, 4), Morgenthau defines six
main principles of political realism. First, politics is governed by ―objective laws that
have their roots in human nature‖ (1985, 3). In order for a society to prosper and survive,
it is imperative for the society to understand the laws by which it is governed. Second,
Morgenthau also argues the main strategy to survive in international arena is to pursue its
interests defined in terms of power (1985, 3). He claims that statesmen think and act in
terms of interest defined as power (Mearsheimer 2001, 19). Third, the concept of interest
defined as power is universal but is not fixed and ―affected by the circumstances of time
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and place‖ (Morgenthau and Thompson 1985, 8). Fourth, the political realism is aware of
the moral significance of political action. The classical realism theory maintains that
―universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of the states‖. Those moral
principles are defined based on circumstances of time and place (1985, 9). Fifth, political
realism does not identify the moral principles of the state with the moral principles of the
universe. Similar to Machiavelli, he supported the notion of reason d‟état and argued that
beyond the frontier of a state there are no ethics or moral principles to which a state
should obey. The only moral principle is the survival of the state. The self-help in an
anarchic international system is the only moral duty. Sixth, according to Morgenthau
―the political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere, as the economist, the
lawyer, and the moralist maintain theirs‖ (1985, 9). For a political realist there are no
other standards of thought other than the political standards. The former are subordinated
to the latter. Together with E. H. Carr (The Twenty Years‟ Crisis, 1919-1939),
Morgenthau became a staunch proponent of realism during the Inter-War Debate (19191939) with the proponents of Liberalism.
Unlike Morgenthau and other classical realists, Kenneth Waltz argues that it is the
anarchy that defines the international system and not the ―lust for power‖. Waltz claims
that great powers are essentially aggressive not because of their ―lust for power‖ but
because of their need to survive in the international system of politics. Waltz believes that
states seek to maximize their security and not their power per se. In addition, according
to Waltz, the structure of the international system forces the states to emphasize the
balance of power. Morgenthau, on the other hand, considers the balance of power as a
―universal concept‖ and defines it as ―a situation of equilibrium as well as any situation
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in which power struggles take place‖ (Keohane 1986, 13). Moreover, Waltz attributes the
security competition and the inter-state conflicts to the absence of a central global
government. He defines the structure of the international system in terms of three main
elements: (1) organizing principles, differential of units, and distribution of capabilities.
The organizing principles are defined through the anarchic status of the international
system and the hierarchical structure of the domestic order. Sovereign states are the units
of the international system. Waltz considers the distribution of capabilities across the
units of the system as the most important factor in defining and understanding the
outcomes of the international politics (Baylis et al. 2008, 98).
Moreover, Waltz differs with Mearsheimer when it comes to the question of the
how much power states want to ensure their survival (Mearsheimer 2001, 21). Waltz
argues that the international structure does not provide states with incentives to maximize
their power. He argues that when great power behave aggressively and aim at
maximizing their powers, they will encourage their potential victims to come together
and balance against the aggressive state(s) (2001, 20). This scenario motivates states to
be security maximizers, instead of being power maximizers, and follow strategies that
would maintain the existing balance of powers. However, it needs to be clarified that
offensive realism, like defensive realism, emphasizes the needs of the state to ensure their
survival. While defensive realism finds the balance of power as the best strategy to
ensure the survival of the state, offensive realism argues that the survival of a state can be
ultimately ensured by reaching the hegemonic status.
Other mainstream theories of international relations include liberalism,
neoliberalism, social constructivism, and Marxist theories. Liberals argue that ―power
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politics itself is the product of ideas, and ideas can change significantly (Baylis et al.
2008, 110). They agree with the realists about the anarchic status of the international
system. However, liberals claim that anarchy is a result of imperialism, failure of the
balance of power, and problems with undemocratic regimes. The latter goes back to the
Kantian argument to achieve perpetual peace by transforming individual consciousness,
promoting Republican Constitutionalism, and abolishing war through a federal contract
between states (2008, 112). Indeed, liberalism has gone through several waves. The first
wave happened after the WWI, culminating with the League of Nations and interrupted
by the WWII. The second wave occurred after the WWII and was interrupted by the Cold
War. The third wave started after the fall of the Soviet Empire and was interrupted by the
September 11th attack on the American soil. The Democratic Peace Theory and
Fukuyama‘s work The End of History and the Last Man (1992) have attempted to provide
some grounds for liberalism. However, liberals have found it hard, so far, to succeed in
their quest to ―domesticate international politics‖.
Neoliberalism is another mainstream theory of international relation. David
Baldwin identifies four varieties of liberalism: (1) commercial liberalism, (2) republican
liberalism, (3) sociological liberalism, and (4) liberal institutionalism (1993).
Neoliberalism, consistently, is used and defined under the principles of liberal
institutionalism. There are several core assumptions of neoliberalism. First, states are the
key actors in the international system but not the only significant ones. Second, states are
guided by rationality and the quest to maximize their interests in issue-areas. Third, states
seek the maximization of their absolute gains through cooperation. Fourth, the greatest
obstacle to successful cooperation is cheating and noncompliance with the established
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rules and contracts. Lastly, states will shift loyalty and resources to institutions if they are
viewed as mutually beneficial and if these serve the international interests of the states
and provide them with opportunities to secure those interests (Baylis et al. 2008, 132).
These main principles are also elaborated in details in Keohane‘s work After hegemony:
Cooperation and discord in the world political economy (2005).
As one may realize, there are several disagreements between neorealists and
neoliberals. While neorealists emphasize the importance of survival in an anarchic
system, neoliberals minimize the importance of survival and claim that neorealists
minimize the importance of international interdependence, globalization, and
international regimes. While realists argue that cooperation depends on the will of the
states, neoliberals argue that cooperation can be achieved in those issue-areas that states
have mutual interests. While neorealists like Mearsheimer emphasize the relative gains,
power, and security, neoliberals focus their attention on absolute gains, the economic
welfare, and the international political economy. And while neorealists argue that
capabilities are essential for security and independence, neoliberals argue that institutions
and preferences are more important (Baylis et al. 2008, 133).
However, some may argue that neorealists and neoliberals disregard some other
factors. First, they both focus on states as the main actors of the international system and
downplay the role of the domestic forces. In addition, they ignore the issues of political
culture, domestic politics, ideology, and identity. Moreover, both neorealists and
neoliberals ignore the fact that political activities may be shifting away from the state,
especially in the new era of globalization or of the economic interdependence.
Furthermore, they both struggle to properly define power and the real interests of the
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states (2008, 135-136).
Social constructivism is another alternative theory to neorealism theory. It is
based on the thoughts of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim and is later developed by
Michel Foucault, Alexander Wendt, Michael Barnet, James Fearon, and others. It is
considered a social theory and has gained grounds since the 80s. Constructivism
emphasizes the human consciousness and its role in international relations. The
assumption that the world is socially constructed means that global change and
transformation can be investigated (2008, 166-169). It deals with the social construction
of the reality and argues that actors, both domestic and international, are created by the
cultural environment. The social construction of reality defines and shapes people‘s
behavior toward the system. In a response to neorealist and neoliberal consensus about
the anarchic status of the international system, Alexander Wendt, a constructivist, stated
that ―anarchy is what states make of it‖ (1992).
Constructivists also argue that knowledge plays a crucial role on how individuals
construct and interpret the world. In addition, constructivists consider rational choice
theory (used by neorealists) as the logic of consequences and mock other theories for not
emphasizing the logic of appropriateness and explaining global transformations.
Regarding power, constructivists claim that the forces of power can be both material and
ideational. Moreover, the effects of power ―go beyond the ability to change behavior‖
(Baylis et al. 2008, 165). Constructivists emphasize ―the diffusion and the
internationalization and institutionalization of norms‖. This can be done through diffusion
and institutional isomorphism. Diffusion deals with the concern of how a particular
model, norm, practice, strategy, or belief spread within a population. Institutional
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isomorphism is a process which maintains that ―those organizations that share the same
environment will, over the time, resemble each other‖ (2008, 169). It is this process of
internationalization and institutionalization of norms that promote conformity,
socialization, and create a sense of ―international community, all of which may cause a
significant change in global politics and world order.
Moreover, Marxist theories have continuously provided interesting ideas that have
attracted a considerable number of scholars. Unlike neorealists who emphasize the role of
the state in international system, Marxists see the state as the source of the problem and
as an apparatus that serves the interests of one class, the capitalist class, at the expenses
of the other class, the working class. Marxist theories share similarities with each other.
They tend to analyze the social world as a totality. They claim that history, economics,
politics, international relations, sociology, philosophy, etc. should be studied in totality.
The academic division in different fields would not provide an accurate explanation of
the reality because ―none can be understood without the knowledge of the others‖ (2008,
145). Another ―key element‖ of the Marxist thought is the materialist conception of
history. For Marxists, historical changes are related to and affected by economic changes.
Means of production and relations of production form the economic base of a society.
The mode of production influences the political, social, and intellectual life of a given
society, known also as superstructure. A change in means of production and relations of
production will cause changes in superstructure.
One major Marxist theory is the World System Theory. The system theory was a
result of a series of critiques on imperialism. The first major work to define a systemic
approach was Lenin‘s Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism. Lenin argued that in
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capitalist states, free competition gave way to monopoly capitalism. Within the world
economy, the monopoly capitalism ―created a two-tier structure‖ consisting of capitalist
states in the core exploiting the less developed states in the periphery. Bourgeoisie of the
states in the core would appease their own proletariat by exploiting states in the
periphery.
The work of Lenin was followed by the Dependency School of Latin America led
by Andre Günter Frank and Henrique Fernando Cardoso. Frank (1984) distinguished core
and periphery by referring to them as metropole for developed capitalist states and
satellite for underdeveloped states. He argued that metropole-satellite relations are also
found at the international level. Frank argued that the most underdeveloped states are
those that have had previous relations with metropoles. However, he acknowledges that
there also exist opportunities for satellites to develop, especially in times of war.
Another major work related to the Marxist though is the world-system theory of
Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein proposed a system whose structure comprised the
core, semi-periphery, and periphery. He argues that capitalism is the driving force of the
expansion, which he defines as ―as system of production for sales in a market for profit
and appropriation of this profit on the basis of individual and collective ownership‖ (as
cited in Baylis et al. 147). However, Wallerstein‘s world-system theory received
continuous and significant critiques by Andre Günter Frank. Frank argued that the world
system was far older than Wallerstein had presented it and has functioned based on the
same process of capital accumulation (Frank and Gills 1996, 4).
Lastly, Marxist theories also include Gramscianis, given after the name of the
Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci. Gramsci was the first to make a detailed analysis on the
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concept of hegemony. Gramsci argues that it is the hegemony of the ruling class that
allows the moral, political, and cultural values of the dominant group to be broadly
disperse throughout society and to be accepted by subordinate groups and classes as their
own (Baylis et al. 2008, 150). This process takes place through the institutions of the civil
society and hegemony is achieved when those values are considered to be ―common
sense‖. According to Gramsci, a given order is defined by the historic bloc, which is a
―mutual reinforced‖ and ―reciprocal relationship‖ between the socioeconomic relations
(base) and political and cultural practices (superstructure) (2008, 150). The ideas of
Gramsci were applied later by his supporters to define the international system. Other
Marxist theories include critical theory and New Marxism, both of which do not play a
significant role in the field of international relations.
As we may realize, each of these theories presented here has a unique view of the
world affairs. Despite similarities, they all see the world from different angles and have
different principal approaches. However, just e few of these theories provide
comprehensible explanations of the reality of the world‘s politics. Offensive realism
theory of international relations is one of these theories. It provides an objective and
rational approach to the issues of the international relations and clearly defines the nature
of these relations. This study endeavors to prove that the security and foreign policy of
the Islamic Republic of Iran is guided by the main principles of the theory of offensive
realism. The following case studies will be used to validate this assumption.

67

Chapter Seven
Iran‘s Policy During the Iran-Iraq War
The Iran-Iraq War was the first event to reveal the true nature of the security and
foreign policy of the Islamic Iran. Despite the reduction of the military expenditures and
the decrease of power after the revolution, the new Islamic regime inherited from the
Shah‘s regime a modernized army capable of challenging any other state in the region.
During the 1978, Iran had spent over 15 percent of its total Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) on building its military capabilities (Geller and Singer 1998, 147). In 1978, Iran
ground forces comprised three major field armies. Combat forces included three armored
divisions, three infantry divisions, and four independent brigades. In addition, Iran
inherited formidable air forces that included 460 combat aircraft (many of which were
Tomcat fighters), spread in 14 air bases, and close to 100,000 men in personnel (1998,
147). Moreover, the navy forces included three destroyer, eight fregates, three diesel
submarines, and twenty-four missile patrol boats. In 1979, the Iranian armed forces
numbered 415,000 men in active duty (1998, 147). In 1980, months before the outbreak
of the war, Iran had oil revenue exceeding $26 billion (Karsh 2002, 14).
On the other hand, Iraq possessed a lesser military capabilities, compare to Iran.
Iraq increased its military capabilities during the period between 1972 and 1980. In 1972,
Iraq spent approximately fourteen percent of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in
advancing and strengthening its military power (Geller and Singer 1998, 147). In 1980,
the military expenditure increased drastically to twenty-one percent of the GDP of the
country. In addition, at the same time, Iraq numbered 212,000 men in the armed forces,
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of which 28,000 were part of the air forces and 4,000 men in navy forces (1998, 148).
This was an indication that Iran was far superior in naval power, despite the fact that Iraq
had a force of ten patrol boats equipped with surface-to-surface missiles. In 1977, the
army comprised four armored divisions, two mechanized divisions, four infantry
divisions, one independent armored brigade, and the Republican Guard mechanized
brigade (1998, 148). To provide its army with sufficient expertise, Iraqi government
collaborated with 2,000 Soviet advisors (1998, 148).
The war started less than six years after Iran and Iraq had signed what is called
The 1975 Algiers Agreement. It was an agreement between both states to settle the
borders dispute and to stop interference in internal affairs of each country. One main
dispute involved the issue of the oil-rich and multi-ethnic province of Khuzestan, which
borders Iraq. Due to the Arab (or non-Persian) majority of the province, Iraq claimed the
historical right to control it. The disputes also involved the Iraq‘s claim about several
small islands in the Persian Gulf that were occupied by the Iranian military. Moreover,
the Shatt al-Arab waterway was another territorial dispute between Iraq and Iran. Due to
Iraq‘s very limited access to the Persian Gulf, the control of the Shatt al-Arab waterway
would become an economic and strategic gain for Iraq. Parties signed the Algiers
Agreement under the promise to permanently stop the disputes and to restore good
relationship and mutual cooperation. The promise for brotherhood between two countries
soon turned into a war of destruction for many years to come.
As mentioned previously, for some scholars, the war was the latest manifestation
of the Arab-Persian struggle for the domination of the Gulf region. For some others, the
war was just the extension of the historic struggle for power between Sunni (Iraq) and the
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Shi‘a Islam (Iran). And for many others, the Iran-Iraq war was a struggle for power and
dominance of the regional politics, following the decline of the Iranian power and
Saddam‘s quest to become the new ―policeman of the region‖. Before him, the Shah of
Iran had argued that ―the responsibility for maintaining Gulf security lay solely with the
local states and that no external states were to be allowed to interfere in the affairs of the
region‖ (Karsh 2002, 7). The Shah strongly believed that the military capability endowed
Iran with the ―historical and the geopolitical obligation‖ to be the ―guardian of the Gulf‖.
The Shah‘s doctrine can be compared to the Monroe Doctrine of the United States in the
Western hemisphere and to the Brezhnev Doctrine of the Soviets in the Eastern Europe.
The ambition of Saddam made no difference from that of the Shah.
However, the situation in the region changed rapidly and radically after the
triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 and the growing hostility between the
Islamic government and the United States, especially after the Islamic conquest of the
U.S. embassy in Tehran. For Iraq, the revolution could expand its impact in other regions
of the Persian Gulf, and a potential Islamic Shi‘a movement would be a serious threat to
the Iraqi regime. In addition, as mentioned previously, the Iraqi leader, Saddam Hussein,
perceived Iran as an easy target due to the vulnerability created internally by the
revolution, the reduction of Iran‘s military power due to the U.S. cancellation of military
aid after the conquest of the U.S. embassy, the demoralization of the army forces,
systematic coups, and persecution and execution of many well-known political figures.
This perception was strengthened by the assumption that by losing the American support,
Iran had lost the political and military support from the West. Saddam also perceived a
shift in military balance would favor Iraq. He thought that through war he would increase
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the power and the influence of Iraq in the region. To all this can be added the Saddam‘s
desire to make Iraq the hegemony of the region
Following this perception, on September 22, 1980, Iraq launched a full-scale
invasion of Khuzistan. As many would have predicted, the international community did
not condemn the Iraq invasion of Iran, instead, the United Nations Security Council
called for immediate cease-fire and the withdrawal of the military troops to the pre-war
borders. Sir Anthony Parsons, a British Ambassador to the United Nations at that time,
stated that the continuation of the hostage crisis had left Iran alone in the international
stage of diplomacy (Ansari 2006, 98). In response to the invasion, the Islamic
government of Iran mobilized the regular army, the Pasdaran, and Basij volunteers,
including young boys and girls. The regime emphasized the notions of Ashoura, Karbala,
Hussein, and the Shi‘a martyrdom. The Iraqi invasion of Iran unified Iran, consolidated
the power of the Islamic Revolution, and undermined the moderate actors of the
revolutionary coalition (Milani, 1994, 207).
However, Israel and the United States were two other major actors that played a
significant role on the conduct and the outcomes of the Iran-Iraq war. Throughout the
war, the United States and Israel provided military assistance to both sides, depending on
the course of the war. Previous to the fall of Shah in 1979, the Iranian-Israeli relations
were friendly and very productive. In the early 1950, Iran de facto recognized the state of
Israel. Relations between these two states were influenced by the fear that both countries
had from other Arab countries in the region. Both countries had realized that it was
through the cooperation with each other that they would be able to keep the regional
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balance of power and confront Arabs. According to a 1979 CIA report on Mossad (Israeli
Secret Service)
―The main purpose of the Israeli relationship with Iran was the development
of a pro-Israel and anti-Arab policy on the part of Iranian officials. Mossad
has engaged in joined operation with SAVAK over the years since the late
1950s. Mossad aided SAVAK activities and supported the Kurds in Iraq. The
Israeli also regularly transmitted to the Iranians intelligence reports on
Egypt's activities in the Arab countries, trend and developments in Iraq, and
communist activities affecting Iran.‖ (as cited in Tarock 1998, 104)
Their relations increased significantly in the mid-1970s when both countries reached an
agreement through which Israel would provide military assistance to Iran in exchange for
oil. This was in continuance of the Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi‘s saying that ―neither
Iran nor Israel wants to be alone in a sea of Arabs.‖ (as cited in 1998, 103)
However, the victory of Islamic Revolution in 1979 severely damaged relations
between two countries. The new Islamic regime closed the Israeli embassy in Tehran
and, ironically, gave it to the Israeli's sworn enemy—Palestinian Liberation
Organization (PLO). Another great event would shake the regional politics in the Middle
East—Iraq would launch the invasion of Iran in September 1980. Having destroyed the
relations with Israel, Iran was now being in a situation that Shah had warned about—
―alone in a sea of Arabs‖. For Israel, this was the best opportunity to re-instate relations
with Iran in order to further its interests and to stop Iraq from gaining power. A powerful
Sunni Iraq would become a far greater danger for the state of Israel compare to the
danger coming from a powerful Iran. In case of a victor Iraq, Israel would be ―alone in a
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sea of Arabs‖. However, in the case of a victor Iran, neither Israel nor Sunni Arabs would
allow a powerful Iran to dominate the Middle East. For Iranians, they had to fight for
their survival. In order to do so, Iran had to substantially increase its military capabilities.
In his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that there are four
main strategies through which a state can gain power relative to the others. First, states
gain power by going to war with the other rival states. In our case, Iraq was the aggressor
and Iran would need a powerful military arsenal to confront Iraq and win the war. The
acquisition of military capabilities to survive the attack became the paramount goal of the
Islamic Iran. Second, states gain power by threatening rival states to use military forces
against them--‖blackmail‖. Iran did not have this privilege because it was already the
victim of an aggression. Third, the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a
―protracted war‖, so that ―they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on
sideline with its military strength intact‖ (Mearsheimer 2001, 147-155). This is the case
when one state causes other state to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be
free in the future to expand its power. In our case, Iran could not be an instigator of an
aggression of which it would be a potential victim. The last strategy that states implement
to gain power is the bloodletting strategy, which aims at causing rival states to fight
against each other in a long and costing conflict. This last strategy provides significant
explanation to the strategy followed by Iran, Israel, and the United States during the IraqIran war. Iran and Israel were bounded by the same interests. Iran needed weapons to
survive the aggression from Iraq, which means following the war strategy. On the other
hand, by providing weapons to Iran, Israel would make sure that Iran and Iraq would
wage a prolonged war against each other and cause each other to ―bleed white‖. A long
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and costing conflict would weaken both Iran and Iraq and would keep Israel in a more
secure position. Thus, by promoting this strategy, Israel ―kills two birds with one
stone‖—It destroys both Iran's and Iraq's military capabilities and reduces their influence
in the region. This would also allow Israel to maintain the status quo of the balance of
power. Despite the interests of Israel in a long and costing Iraq-Iran war, Iran had to
acquire military capabilities in order to survive. The hostage crisis and the Iranian antiWestern rhetoric discouraged Western powers from providing military assistance to Iran.
Military capabilities provided by Washington during the Shah's reign were either
destroyed or needed spare parts.
While the United States and Israel were using bait and bleed and bloodletting
strategies to increase their influence and power in the Middle East, Iran was facing a
situation in which its survival was at stake. It was this need for survival that would lead
Iran to cooperating with the Small Satan and the Great Satan. Indeed, Israel expressed its
concerns soon after Iraq invaded Iran. In a press conference, the Israeli Foreign Minister
Moshe Dayan called on the United States to forget the past events (especially the hostage
crisis that was continuing at that time) and to provide assistance to Iran (Parsi 2007, 105).
Ariel Sharon, then the Israeli Defense Minister, also emphasized the importance of
assisting Iran in this war. He warned U.S. of any possible Soviet intervention in Iran.
All these concerns prepared the stage for what is known as the Operation Seashell
(Bergman 2008, 40-48). This secret operation was implemented by Israel and aimed at
providing Iran with weapons to fight against Iraq. For Israel, there were four main
reasons to support Iran: (1) Israel hoped that by helping Iran and Khomeini in this
situation would ease relationship between two states; (2) Israel hoped that by providing
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arms to Iran, it would cause the war to intensify and increase the possibility for mutual
destruction (This strategy reminds us of the bloodletting strategy); (3) by supporting Iran,
Israel aimed at diminishing the threat coming from a possible victorious Saddam; and (4)
the Israeli weapons industry sought to make money through this opportunity (Bergman
2008, 43).
Due to its desperate need for weapons to stop Iraqi invasion, Iran was willing to
buy weapons from everyone, including the Great and Small Satans (Milani 1994, 212).
The first deal under the operation seashell was made by Israel through an Iranian arms
dealer and a French intermediary. It included the purchase of 250 tires for Phantom jet
fighters, communication equipment, 106mm recoilless guns, ammunitions, and mortars
(Bergman 2008, 44). The operation continued later through a Portuguese arms dealer
named George Piniol. For Iranians, the deals were conducted under the close surveillance
and patronage of Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai, who was a distant relative to Khomeini and a very
credible person to the Supreme Leader. Tabatabai identified himself as a representative of
the Defense Council of the Revolution, which held considerable power within the power
structure and was the primary actor of Iran‘s security and intelligence system. Piniol
began his first deal with the purchase by Iranian of 150 M-40 antitank guns and 24,000
shells for each gun. Iranians had provided Piniol with a detailed list about the items to be
bought. The list included spare parts for tanks and aircraft engines, shells for 106mm
recoilless rifles and for 130mm, 203mm, and 175mm guns, and TOW vehicle-mounted
launchers and missiles (2008, 45).
The Israeli technology and arms company Elul realized that everything Iran
needed was available in the warehouse of the Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) and the
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Israel Military Industries. Some of the items needed by the Iranians were in the Israel
Defense Forces Stockpiles. The arsenal planned to be given to the Iranians included a
total of 360 tons of spare parts and ammunitions. In order to avoid any possible scandal,
Piniol managed to get officials of the Argentinean airline Transporte Aereo Rioplatense
to conduct the transportation of the military arsenal to Iran. This deal included eighteen
flights, with each flight carrying twenty tons of spare parts and ammunitions. The total
cost to be paid by Iran was $75 million (2008, 45). In mid-1981, an Argentinean plane
carrying military supplies from Israel to Iran crashed in the Soviet Union borders with
Turkey (Tarock 1998, 106). However, this incident did not stop the operation. It needs to
be mentioned that besides Piniol‘s deals, there existed many other channels through
which Israel sold arms to Iran. According to another arm dealer working at that time for
the Iranian government, approximately 80 percent of the weapons sold to Iran soon after
the beginning of the war came from Israel (Parsi 2007, 106). It was due to this weaponry
support from Israel that Iran managed to turn the tide of the war to its advantages.
Based on Mearsheimer's theory of offensive realism, the United States would
behave as an offshore balancer of power and would suppress any tentative made by any
state to reach the status of a regional hegemony. Fearing that Iraq (in case of victory
against Iran) would elevate itself to a regional hegemon, the Americans saw Iran as the
main actor at the opportune time to stop Iraq from reaching that status. In addition to this
strategy, the Americans sought to prevent the Soviets from increasing their influence in
Iran and in the region. However, once the American officials realized that Iran was
gaining strength, they immediately launched an anti-Iran strategy. This strategy consisted
oj supporting Iraq both directly and indirectly, financially and militarily. In 1982, the
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U.S. State Department removed Saddam from the department‘s list of ―sponsors of
terrorism‖, and in 1984, diplomatic relations with Baghdad were established. Also, in
1984, the Reagan administration launched the Operation Staunch, which aimed at
stopping the flow of arms to Iran. The first effect of this new operation was the downing
of an Iranian F-4 plane from an Arab F-15 in May 1984. This opened the way for U.S. to
provide military assistance to Arabs, which included 400 Stinger missiles, 200 missile
launchers, and the deployment of a CENTCOM KC-10 tanker aircraft (Marschall 2003,
183). Iraq also became the largest importer of weapons in the region. The Soviets became
the main providers of arms for Iraq. The West Germany also assisted Iraq in building
chemical and biological weapons, which were used later by Saddam against Kurds and
Iranians. France provided Iraq with aircraft and long-range bombers. The Iran-Iraq war
became a concern when Iraq began the tanker war, which consisted of attacks on oiltransporting ships in the Persian Gulf. This type of war endangered the U.S. interests in
the Gulf. The U.S. navy soon became involved in this type of war by supporting Iraq and
attacking the Iranian navy.
Meanwhile, another affair would shake the international community, especially
the politics of Iran, Israel, and the United States. This affair came to be known as the
Iran-Contra affair and consisted of illegal arms support from U.S. and Israel to Iran in
exchange for hostages and money for Contras in Nicaragua. The Iran-Contra affair,
which became public in November of 1986, became the first major (public) event to
question the ideological approach of Iran's authorities on security and foreign policy in
the region. Being under the persistent threat from Iraq, Iranian leadership was willing to
trade their Shi‘a ideological for the ultimate ideology of survival in the international
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system of politics. Both the ―Great‖ and the ―Small Satan‖ could supply Iran with
military capabilities that Iran so desperately needed to confront Iraq. This opened the
stage for the Iran-Contra affair, which engaged Iran, Israel, and U.S., altogether.
The idea to circumvent the Operation Staunch was first planned at a meeting in
Hamburg in late 1984 between several Israelis (arms dealers and political advisers) with
close ties to high-ranking Israelis officials and the Iranian arms dealer Manuchehr
Ghobanifar, a close collaborator of the powerful head of the Majles, Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafshanjani. Iran was in a desperate need for spare parts and other weaponry assistance.
The operational capabilities of the Iranian Air Forces were drastically lowered after the
1982 offensive and due to the absence of spare parts. This problem became a priority
concern when Saddam launched the War of the Cities attack on Iran through aerial
bombardments (Ansari 2006, 109). They realized that Israel would be the best
intermediary to convince the Americans to provide spare parts weapons for the Iranian
army. Rafsanjani, a high-profile Shi‘a clergy and a close collaborator to Khomeini, gave
clear indications that Iran was in a desperate need to restock its military arsenal even
though a collaboration of the United States.
The Americans joined the plot in the summer of 1985. In July, President Reagan
authorized contacts with the Iranian authorities, and in August he gave the ―green light‖
for the operation to begin. Through the secret negotiations, the United States aimed at
releasing the U.S. citizens taken hostages by the Lebanese Shi‘ite terrorist organization
Hezbollah, preventing the Soviet expansion in Iran, stabilizing the oil prices, and
collecting money for Contras in Nicaragua (Marschall 2003, 183). Based on the report of
the Congressional Committee investigating the Iran-Contra affair, U.S. provided Iran,
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through two weapons shipments, to Iran, with 504 TOW missiles (Hamilton and Inouye
1987, 169). The report of the Congressional Committees investigating the Iran-Contra
affair, among other things, argued:
―Tehran had its own agenda. Rhetoric not withstanding—the United States was
considered 'The Great Satan' and Israel a blasphemy—Tehran wanted modern
tanks and high-technology antitank and anti-aircraft missiles to encounter
Iraq's Soviet-made fighter planes and modern tanks. It needed spare parts to
maintain the arsenal of weapons that the Shah had purchased from the United
States.‖ (1987, 163)
According to one source, with assistance from Israel, the United States secretly
provided Iran through six shipments with more than 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles, 235
Hawk anti-aircraft missiles, and considerable spare parts, all of which with a cost of
about $64 million (Marschall 2003, 183). At the same time, the Americans provided Iraq
with military intelligence and AWACS planes. According to another source, weaponry
shipments occurred as follow: on August 20th 1985 were shipped 96 TOW missiles, on
September 14th were shipped 408 TOWs, on November were shipped Hawks missiles,
and on February 19th 1986 were shipped 500 TOWS (Wroe 1991, ii-iii). On May 23rd, an
American delegation headed by the former national security advisor, Robert McFarlane,
went to Tehran for direct talks about the hostage issues, taking with them Hawk spare
parts. The shipments continued in August and October.
On the beginning of November, a Beirut magazine published details of
McFarlane‘s trip to Tehran. This information was leaked to the newspaper by Mehdi
Hashemi, an associate of Ayatollah Ali Montazeri. Montazeri was at that time the
designated successor to Khomeini‘s office and a fierce opponent of Rafsanjani. This
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event cost Montazeri his political career. The irony of the fact is that Hashemi who
revealed the secret dealings with U.S and Israel was executed by the Islamic regime and
Rafsanjani who orchestrated the dealings remained free and untouchable from the
regime. In addition, leaders of the two countries, of U.S. and Iran, both refuted the fact of
having information about the secret dealings. Surprisingly, after such controversies, they
both promoted aggressive policies and rhetoric against each other.
Thus, based on the above information, the Iran-Iraq war serves as a good
indicator to define the main factors that shaped the security and foreign policies of states
involved in this affair. Both Iran and Iraq possessed significant military capabilities. The
history has shown Iran to be suspicious of the intentions of other neighboring countries
like Iraq. Agreements like the 1975 Algiers Agreement did little to stop Iraq from
invading Iran. It was the shift in the balance of power favoring Iraq that created the
premises for Iraq to attack Iran. On the other hand, Iran's ultimate ideology of survival
dominated any other ideological predisposition. The need for survival led Iranian leaders
to enter in secret negotiations with countries they considered the Great and the Small
Satans. These negotiations helped Iran increase its military capabilities in order to
survive the Iraqi invasion. Israel and the United States, on the other hand, entered the
negotiations for different reasons. Israel needed to prevent any disturbance of the balance
of power in the region that would jeopardize Israel's security and survival. Its goal to
diminish the Iranian and Iraqi power and influence in the region through the bloodletting
strategy became a priority for the Israelis. Moreover, the Iran-Iraq war reveals the role of
the United States as the ―offshore balancer‖. Its goal was to not allow any state to reach
the status of the regional hegemony that would upset the balance of power.
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Chapter Eight
Iran‘s Policy Toward the Russian-Chechen Conflict
Why studying the Russian-Chechen conflict as pertinent case in analyzing Iran's
security and foreign policy? The answer is simple: Because Chechnya is a republic
predominantly of Muslim population and Russia has been historically a threat to the
Iranian sovereignty. According to 2002 census, Chechnya had a population of 1.1
million, 93.5% of whom were Muslims. The Article 3(16) of the Islamic Constitution of
Iran enumerates that the government of the Islamic Republic of Iran has the duty of
directing all its resources to, among others, the goal of ―framing the foreign policy of the
country on the basis of Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims, and
unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world‖. On the other hand, as analyzed
previously, Iran still has fresh memories of the Russian-Persian wars which resulted in
the signing of the Treaty of Gulistan (1813) and the Treaty of Turkomanchai (1826). Both
these treaties annexed Iranian territories in favor of Russia. The Anglo-Soviet invasion of
1941 reminds Iranians that history may repeat itself. Thus, Iran has all the reasons to fear
it neighboring Russia.
During the era of the Soviet Empire, Chechnya, together with Ingushetia, formed
an autonomous republic under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The collapse of
the Soviet Union was followed by a Chechen independence movement led by the former
Soviet air force general Dzhokar Dudayev. On October 27th 1991, the Chechen Central
Election Commission held presidential and parliamentary elections, which were won by
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Dudayev by a plebiscite vote (Graney 2004, 122). On November 1st of the same year,
Dudayev issued decree declaring the Chechen Republic a ―sovereign state‖. The
parliament ratified the decree the next day. For Dudayev, his supporters, and the Russian
authorities in Moscow this meant a de facto declaration of independence and an act of
secession from the Russian Federation (2004, 122). Boris Yeltsin, then the head of the
federation, reacted fiercely by imposing martial law in the Chechen Republic and sending
600 federal troops of the Interior Ministry to Chechnya. Faced with a strong Chechen
opposition, the federal troops failed to complete their mission. This opened the stage for a
long-term conflict between Chechen separatists and the Russian federal troops.
The conflict escalated from 1994 to 1996 in what is called the First Chechen War.
For the Russians, the war against the Chechens became a proactive strategic movement
that would prevent other republics from demanding secession. For the Chechen forces, it
became a war of independence and of survival. The results of this war were tragic. The
number of casualties (including Chechen and Russian troops and civilians) up to
February of 1995 varied from 5,000 to 35,000, depending on the source (Seely 2001,
258). The ―storming of Grozny‖ by the federal troops caused the displacement and killing
of thousands of civilians. During the 21 months of the first Chechen war, nearly 40%,
(400,000 to 600,000 people) of the Chechen pre-war population was displaced from their
homes and fled to neighboring republics (Global Security.org n.d.; Holland 2004, 335).
The Second Chechen War, which began in 1999 and continued until the
restoration of the federal government, increased the scale of atrocities conducted against
the civilian population on both sides. In their quest to crush Chechen separatists, the
Russian forces perpetrated extra-legal and summary executions, forced disappearance,
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tortures, rapes, attacks and assassination of civilians, and other horrendous crimes
(Holland 2004, 336).
Seeing that the profile of Chechnya's population is predominantly of Muslim
population and that it was fighting for their own freedom against a non-Muslim
(Christian) country, many would believe that Iran would side with Chechnya to condemn
the Russian aggression. The Constitution of Iran clearly demands the government to
frame its foreign policy based on ―Islamic criteria, fraternal commitment to all Muslims,
and unsparing support to the freedom fighters of the world‖. Iran had previously followed
this constitutional obligation in the Middle East by supporting the Palestinian cause and
by promoting aggressive policies against the Israeli and the U.S. involvement in the
region. Iran, like no other Muslim state, has relentlessly condemned Israel‘s and the U.S.
policies in the Middle East, considering them anti-Islam policies. The U.S. involvement
in Iraq and Afghanistan are two other cases in which the Iranian fierce rhetoric has
received a prime-time focus. Not only was Iran vehemently supporting its Muslim
brothers in Middle East, but it was also supporting every Muslim cause around the globe.
Not only was it providing support for its Shi‘a brothers of Hezbollah, but it was also
providing assistance to its Sunni counterpart, Al Qaeda. Thus, rarely we can find news
from the Muslim world where Iran has had no blueprint on it.
However, as strange as it may sound, the Iranian policy toward the RussianChechen conflict was completely different from the other cases mentioned previously.
While many other Muslim countries condemned the Russian aggression on Chechnya, it
became obvious that Iran had no intention of jeopardizing its ―fruitful relations‖ with
Russia. It was not a common political relationship. It was ―a strategic relationship‖

83

(Freedman 2000, 70). It was the time again for Iran to set aside its ideological
predispositions. In March 1996, months before the end of the First Chechen War, the
Iranian Foreign Minister, Ali Akbar Velayati, in a visit to Moscow, stated that IranianRussian relations were ―at their highest level in contemporary history‖ (as cited in 2000,
71). In 1999, then the Iranian Foreign Minister, Kamal Kharrazi, expressed this political
position to his Russian counterpart, Igor Ivanov, by adding that Tehran was ready ―to
undertake effective collaboration in the struggle against terrorists to destabilize the
situation in Russia‖ (as cited in Samii 2001, 49). Russian diplomats responded by stating
that the Iranian policy toward the Chechen conflict promised for productive bilateral
relations between two countries.
In 1999, Iran became the head of the Organization of the Islamic Conference
(OIC). This new position obligated Iran to serve and protect the welfare of all Muslims
around the world. Despite this fact, Iran‘s policy toward Russia did not show any
significant change. The Iranian rhetoric against the Russian invasion of Chechnya was
sporadic and without resonance. In the midst of the Second Chechen War, in early
January 2000, President Sayyed Mohammed Khatami congratulated Vladimir Putin on
assuming the office of the Russian President and emphasized the hopes for further
intensification of contacts with Moscow (Malek 2008, 2). Vladimir Putin was then the
Prime Minister and one of the leading Russian strategists of the Russian-Chechen
conflict. In 2003, Hamid Reza Assefi, the Iranian representative of the Ministry of the
Foreign Affairs, declared that the conflict was an ―internal affair‖ of Russia:
―We tolerate all measures of Russia that are peaceful and aimed at respecting
and guaranteeing the rights of Russia's multinational population, including the
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Muslims. Iran welcomes the respect the Russian Federation pays to the many
representatives of the Islamic faith and, by all means, considers the problem
with the Chechen Republic to be an internal Russian affair.‖ (as cited in Malek
2008, 2)
The Chechen's field commander Chechen field commander Shamil Basayev
adamantly responded to the Iranian statements that the war was Russia‘s ―internal affair‖.
In an open letter to the Iranian leadership, Basayev asked a series of questions which
questioned the Islamic ideology of the Iranian government. Among others, he questioned:
―Since when have the infidels become closer to you than the Muslims?”, “Who
released you from Jihad?”, “Why is the murder of Muslims an internal affair for
the infidels?”, “If Ichkeria [Chechnya] is Russia‟s internal affair, why is Iran
not the U.S.A.‟s internal affair?”, “Is it not better to be terrorists in the eyes of
the infidels than hypocrites in the eyes of God?”, and “Iran is the closest
neighbor of the Caucasus and Chechnya. Is it not your direct duty before God . .
. in accordance with Sharia, to take part in Jihad and support the Muslims
waging war for Islam?‖ (as cited in Samii 2001, 50)
For Chechens, Iran had become an agent of Russia from whom they could not hope for
support. Despite the main theme of the Iranian foreign policy toward Russia-Chechen
conflict, in 2005, rumors were spread to indicate that Iranian Revolutionary Guard had
used its training camps to train Chechen fighters and launch then back in battlefields of
Chechnya. However, these rumors did not have any significant impact on Iran-Russia
cooperation.
In addition, other Muslim countries and organizations responded to the Chechen
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conflict by focusing their attacks mostly on Russia. Allahshukur Pashazade, head of the
Spiritual Board of Muslims of the Caucasus, declared that regardless of its statements
―from the very beginning up to now the Russian empire has been against the Muslim
religion and Muslims‖(2001, 51). Furthermore, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Amir
Musa commented that ―in the future meeting of the OIC foreign ministers, top priority
should be given to the Chechnya crisis, and it is essential that the Islamic states adopt
united stances on this issue‖ (2001, 51). In addition, Usamah al-Baz, political advisor to
the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, ―emphasized that the method of deploring and
condemning aggression was not the ideal treatment of the tragedy of the Chechen people‖
(2000, 51). The government of Afghanistan acted aggressively by recognizing the
independence of Chechnya and stated that ―It is not justifiable for the Islamic countries to
turn their back on the Chechen nation in the name of their international expediencies‖
(2001, 52). In order to defend their position toward the conflict, the Iranian officials
declared that the Chechen rebel forces ―were backed by ‗external forces‘ which were
enemies of Iran and Russia alike‖, referring to the involvement of the U.S. and Turkey
(Malek 2008, 4). Besides admitting the fact that Iran was not supporting Chechen
movement, this excuse did little to justify in the eyes of the other Muslim states Iran‘s
policy toward the Chechen conflict.
The Iranian policy toward the Russian-Chechen conflict brings forth the
questions: ―Why didn't Iran support its Muslim brothers in Chechnya?‖ and ―Why did
Iran side with Russia?‖ This brings up the main argument of this study, which states that
the Iranian security and foreign policy is guided by its ultimate ideology of survival and
the main principles of the offensive realism. Iran's cooperation with Russia and its neutral
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position during the Chechen struggle for freedom is a product of an Iranian rational
choice. Iran calculated and feared that a support for the Chechens would cause Russia to
stop providing military assistance and military-related technology that Iran so desperately
needed. In addition, in supporting the Chechen separatist movement, Iran would
inadvertently encourage the Azeri separatist movement in Northwestern Iran, or fearing
that Russia would support the separatist movements in Iran in a retaliatory strategy. Thus,
the main strategy leading the security and foreign policy of the Islamic Iran toward
Russian-Chechen conflict was to enhance its military capabilities and to prevent any
separatist movements within its territory. The paramount goal leading to this strategy was
the survival of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its sovereignty.
Since its birth, the major threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran has been the
subversive regional strategy of the United States. The United States came out of the Cold
War victorious and more powerful. More important, there was no other great power
capable of challenging its domination of the international system. Russia was suffering
from radical changes in its political and economic system. China was struggling with its
economy, and Europe had its own problems at home. The other powers were looking at
U.S. to launch its new post-Cold War strategy from which they might profit. The Islamic
Republic of Iran had seen U.S as the major threat to its existence. In January of 1995,
U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher openly called for an overthrow of the Islamic
regime by stating: ―We must isolate Iraq and Iran until there is a change in their
governments, a change in their leadership‖ (as cited in Gerges 1999, 132). Some
considered this reaction as being part of Christopher's past experience with Iran when the
hostage crisis vanished his hopes to be Secretary of State under the Carter administration.
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In addition, there had been prevailing assumptions among the Iranian leadership that the
primary goal of the United States was to change the Islamic regime.
However, many may consider the security relationship with Russia to be an
anomaly because Iran historically has seen Russians with a deep suspicion. Russians,
alone and in collaboration with the British forces, had conquered and annexed territories
that previously belonged to the Persian Empire. They had sought to divide Iran into
spheres of influence. In order to ensure its regime survival, Iran's leadership put the
emphasis on military capabilities and decided to increase its capabilities by cooperating
with the Russian Federation, after having relied for decades on U.S. military assistance
and weapons. At the same time, Iran would rely on U.S. to avoid any possible aggressive
tentative by the Russians to extent their influence in Iran. This was the same strategy that
Iran followed during the 19th century when Russia and the Great Britain struggled with
each other for the domination of Iran. At that time, Iran played the role of the balancer.
While the Americans might have not liked the current Iranian regime, they would
(inadvertently) have played the role of the Iranian defender by not allowing any Russian
expansion in its former ―protectorate‖. Thus, Iran was protected by both the United States
and Russia. Iran was also, at the same time, playing the role of the balancer. The situation
would have changed only if the two great powers (U.S. and Russia) would have reached a
consensus regarding Iran. That would have been very dangerous for Iran. Russia, on its
part, would have supported Iran, motivated by the goal to minimize the U.S. influence in
the Middle East. As the offensive realism also maintains, the Iranian leaders recognized
that the more military capabilities they gained, the more secure they would be from the
foreign dominance and invasion. Besides the traditional military arsenal, the Iranians
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realized that possessing nuclear capability would dramatically increase their power and
influence and would ensure their survival.
Tentative to expand it military power had started in 1989 when Iran launched an
ambitious effort to rebuild its military potential and transform itself into a regional
military power. Iran's military arsenal at that time included 100-200 combat aircraft;
1,000-2,000 armored vehicles; several submarines; and as many as a dozen missile boats
(Eisenstadt, 2001). Parallel with this military strategy, Iran had accelerated its tentative to
enhance its missile technology, which culminated on February 3rd, 2009 with the
launching of the first satellite into space (Fathi and Broad, 2009). Having a sophisticated
missile technology would give Iran significant advantage in fighting against other
aggressive states, which cannot be reached by the conventional weapons in Iran's
disposition. It also would provide Iran with the capability to deliver warheads to
distanced locations.
The first main agreement between Iran and Russia dated back in 1989 when
Rafsanjani negotiated with the Soviets in Moscow. Russia inherited this agreement and
implemented part of the agreement due to the Russian demand for direct payment and the
Iranian lack of economic power to buy them all. From this agreement, Iran received 422
T-72 tanks, 413 BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicles, and self-propelled artillery; SA-5 and
SA-6 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs); 12 Su-24 and 24 MiG-29 fighters; and three Kiloclass submarines, along with advanced torpedoes and mines (Eisenstadt 2001; Samii
2001, 55). Meanwhile, U.S. feared that the Iranian arsenal could destabilize the balance
of power in the region and forced the Russians to stop their transfer of technology and
military capabilities to Iran. Under the American pressure, the Russian President Boris
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Yeltsin pledged to stop the arms trade with Iran in September 1994. In June of 1995,
Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin and the U.S. Vice President Al Gore
signed an agreement in which Russia promised to ―fulfill existing contracts by the end of
1999 and would not sign any new ones‖ (Eisenstadt 2001).
Despite the Gore-Chernomyrdin Agreement, the Russian and Iranian officials
allegedly met in early 1997 to discuss new arms deals. These supposedly involved the
possible sale of eight Su-25 attack aircraft; 25 Mi-17 transport helicopters; hundreds of
T-72 tanks; 500-1,000 SA-16/18 Igla shoulder-launched SAMs; several battalions of SA10 and SA-12 SAMs; air-surveillance radars; and several other items (Eisenstadt 2001).
In violation of the agreement, Russia transferred to Iran other five Mi-17s starting in
January 2000, while in November 2000, an Israeli newspaper reported ―the imminent
departure of a shipment‖ of 700 SA-16/18 Igla missiles for Iran (2001). In the middle of
the Second Chechen War, in November of 2000, Russia officially nullified the GoreChernomyrdin agreement and together with Iran signed another agreement that would
start a new phase in the military and technology cooperation.
However, acquiring military capabilities and power was not Iran's goal in itself.
The real goal was to acquire military capabilities that would surpass the capabilities of
other states in the region. This phenomenon deals with the main realist/neorealist
concepts of relative and absolute gains. According to Joseph Grieco, states aim at
increasing their power and influence (absolute gains) through cooperation with other
states (as cited in Baylis, Smith, and Owens, 2008, p. 129). However, states are always
concerned about the gains of other states in multilateral or bilateral cooperation (relative
gains). In its cooperation with Russia, Iran aimed at increasing its regional power in
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influence. Iran was not concerned about the relative gains of Russia because Russia was
already significantly superior to Iran and U.S. was far superior to not allow Russia to
threaten Iran's sovereignty or to disturb the balance of power. Indeed, Iran sought to use
the absolute gains extracted from cooperation with Russia to increase its power and
influence in the Middle East. This would create the premises for reaching the status of the
regional hegemony, which in turn would provide more security for Iran. The Iran's
nuclear ambition provided sufficient and credible support to this argument.
The Iran's nuclear ambitions date back in the Shah era, but they were
reinvigorated in the midst of the Iran-Iraq war due to the perceived threat to its
sovereignty coming from Iraq. Having the Germans abandoning the project following the
Islamic Revolution, Iran relied on Soviets to pursue its nuclear ambitions. The Iran-Iraq
war reminded the Iranians of the fact that the international system was anarchic and selfhelp and preparedness were the most effective ways to deal with possible foreign
aggressions. In January 1995, Iran and Russia signed an agreement which dealt with the
construction by the Russian specialists of a nuclear power plant at Bushehr. In July 2002,
notwithstanding the U.S. opposition, Russia declared that it would help Iran build five
additional nuclear reactors. Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran caused severe
diplomatic disagreements between the United States and Russia. The Americans saw the
Russian nuclear assistance to Iran as part of the Russian strategy to undermine the U.S.
interests in the Middle East. Regardless of these disagreements, Iran‘s nuclear activity
intensified in 1999. This intensification of the nuclear program happened in a time when
the U.S. government was attempting to establish relations with Iran whose government
was supposedly led by the reformers.
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The nuclear program became an international issue in 2002 when it was revealed
that Iran had secretly built fuel cycle facilities. The pursuit of the nuclear program had a
little rationality to support the argument that its final product would be for economic
purpose. The American leaders demanded Russia to not supply any nuclear fuel to the
Bushehr reactor unless Iran agreed to send all used fuel back to Moscow. In addition to
the American demands, Moscow should withhold the nuclear fuel until Iran signed an
additional protocol with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) permitting that
agency unannounced visits to all Iranian nuclear facilities (Freedman 2006, 19). This
discovery caused the head of the IAEA, Muhammad Al Baradei, to visit Tehran in 2003.
Al Baradei urged Iran to stop the nuclear activity and ratify the Additional Protocol (AP)
with the EU-3 (Great Britain, Germany, and France). Being under pressure from IAEA
and fearing possible U.S. military action, Iran accepted and signed the agreement. Since
then, Iran has systematically violated any agreement and broken any promise it has made
to the international community. The Iranian-Russian nuclear cooperation still continues
today, raising serious concerns about the outcome of this cooperation. This revelation and
the future events that follow Iran's nuclear ambitions have given Iran a new status and
profile in international arena.
However, the main questions that most political scientist and politicians face
today are: (1) what is the goal of Iran in pursuing the nuclear program? and (2) what
factors shape this goal? In following the principles of the offensive realism, the argument
holds that Iran's nuclear program is an extension and growth of the military capabilities to
insure the survival of the Islamic Republic. To insure its survival, Iran seeks to militarily
dominate other states in the region. As a consequence, Iran aims at increasing its military
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power until the status of the regional hegemony is achieved. Shahram Chubin argues that
there are four main goals that drive Iran toward a nuclear capability (2006, 8-13). First, it
is the goal to deter other countries from taking any possible military actions against Iran.
The Iraqi invasion of Iran showed the importance of possessing sufficient military
capabilities to deter attacks from hostile states. Possessing a nuclear arsenal would
provide Iran with significant capability to retaliate against any military attack from
outside. Facing retaliation, foreign forces would be reluctant to attack Iran due to their
fear of a very costly conflict. Other forces are aware that this may lead to a mutual
assured destruction (MAD). Second, a nuclear arsenal would increase the Iranian
influence in the region. As previously mentioned, this is not a new idea for Iranians. It is
an idea that dates back during the times of Cyrus and Darius the Great, idea that was
revived during the Shah‘s era. Its history and the geographical location make the Iranian
leaders believe that they are entitled to a privileged status in the Middle East, and
probably in the world. Third, a nuclear arsenal would give Iran significant bargaining
power in dealing with regional and global issues. Lastly, the nuclear program would be a
nationalist card for regime legitimation. The new Islamic government considers the
nuclear arsenal a powerful tool that would make Iran independent of other states and
would ensure the survival of the regime. The fate of the nuclear program will also be the
fate of the regime. Russia happened to be its strategic partner in achieving (or even
coming closer to achieving) these paramount goals. As a rational actor, Iran would never
jeopardize this productive and strategic relationship.
Lastly, the territorial integrity played a crucial role in shaping Iran's position
toward the Russian-Chechen conflict. Iran feared that an independent Chechnya would
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encourage minorities within Iran to strive for their independence. Potential separatist
movements might come from Azeris in Northwest, Arabs in South, Kurds in West,
Turkmen in Northeast, and Baluchis in Southeast of Iran. Iran had previously sided with a
Christian country (Armenia) in its struggle against a Muslim country (Azerbaijan) in
order to prevent any future separatist movement from growing in its Northern borders.
This fear urged the Iranian Defense Ministry official Alireza Akbari to declare that
Russian-Chechen conflict was a result of the threat that Chechen movement posed to the
Russian territorial integrity. He also warned that ―A victory for the separatist trends
promoted by leaders of Chechen armed groups would trigger a domino effect in the
region – the issue of territorial integrity of other countries in the region would arise‖ (as
cited in Samii 2001, 55). Seeing that its neighbor Azerbaijan has the potential to instigate
an Azeri‘s separate movement in Northwest, Iran was determined to not provide any
precedent that would act as a catalyst for such a movement. An anti-Russian foreign
policy toward the Chechen conflict would also make Russia not only stop the military
assistance, but it would also pursue an anti-Iranian policy by sponsoring the separatist
movements, especially the Azeri's movement. Thus, Iran also saw the cooperation with
Russia as the best ways to forestall and suppress any potential separatist movement that
would threaten its territorial integrity.
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Chapter Nine
Iran‘s Policy Toward Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict During the Post Soviet Era
The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is another crucial event in understanding the
security and foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are three main reasons
for studying Iran‘s policy toward the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. First, both Armenia
and Azerbaijan (Republic of Azerbaijan) are Iran‘s neighbors, which share land borders
among each others. Iran and Azerbaijan border each other in the Caspian Sea and share
about 611 kilometers of the land borders (Djalili 2002, 49-50). In addition, Iran borders
the south of Armenia in a land borderline of 35 kilometers. The geostrategic location of
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Iran raised certain geopolitical issues, including pipelines,
division of the Caspian Sea, Nagorno Karabakh region, and the issue of Southern
Azerbaijan. All the above issues set the stage for other great powers to be involved in
regional politics. For example, the pipeline issue created two main groups with opposing
interests. On the one hand, there was the bloc created by the Azerbaijani cooperation with
the U.S., Turkey, European Union, and Georgia. On the other hand, there was the bloc
comprising Russia, Iran, and Armenia, who found their interests challenged by the first
bloc. When it came to the division of the Caspian Sea, alliances changed and became
very complicated. Azerbaijan allied with Russia, Turkey, U.S., and Kazakhstan, while
Iran was left on the other side with Turkmenistan. However, it needs to be emphasized
that Russia saw the Turkish and the U.S. involvement in this matter with deep suspicion
and concerns. The Nagorno-Karabakh issue, which was the main cause of the Armenian-
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Azerbaijani conflict, created a new configuration of politics in the region and revealed the
true nature of Iran‘s foreign policy toward both countries (analyzed below in this case
study).
Second, both the Republics of Armenia and Azerbaijan have been under the
Iranian (Persian) domination for centuries. Armenia has been subject to conquests from
the Persian Empire, starting with the conquests from Cyrus and Darius the Great and
ending with conquests from the Safavid dynasty. Like Armenia, Azerbaijan has been part
of the Persian Empire throughout the history, or of what was called the Greater Iran.
However, during the Russo-Persian wars in the beginning of the 19th century, much of
the Caucasus was occupied by the Russian troops and was formally ceded to Russia
under the terms of the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) (mentioned
earlier in the study). This event brought the creation of two ―Azerbaijans‖—the South
and the North Azerbaijan. The North Azerbaijan became the Democratic Republic of
Azerbaijan under the sovereignty of the Russian Empire. This part would declare its
independence from the Russian domination in 1918, proclaiming the Azerbaijani
Democratic Republic (ADR). However, in 1945, the new republic was invaded by the
Soviet army and became part of the Soviet Empire. Azerbaijan restored its independence
soon after the official demise of the Soviet Empire in late 1991. The Southern Azerbaijan
was considered the Northwestern part of Iran populated by Azeris. Actually, there are
more Azeris living in the Northwest Iran than are in the Republic of Azerbaijan (Freij
1996, 73). There is a lack of consensus regarding the actual number of Azeris population
in the northwest of Iran. Some researches indicate that Azeris comprise from one-fifth to
one-third of the Iranian population, while the total number varies from twenty to twenty-
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seven million Azeris (Shaffer 2000, 473).
The third main reason to study Iran‘s policy toward Armenian-Azerbaijani
conflict is the specific formation of the latter countries. At the time of the conflict,
Armenia was predominantly a Christian country (approximately 95% of its population)
and was characterized by uniqueness in religious practices and in spoken language.
Despite their past engagements with each other, Armenian did not share much value and
traditions with Iran. The majority of Armenians practiced an orthodox form of
Christianity, and its church was named the Armenian Apostolic Church. It was the first
nation to adopt Christianity as a state religion. On the other hand, Azerbaijan and Iran
shared values from their mutual past and certain elements of a common culture. After
Iran, Azerbaijan had the second largest Shi'i population in the world. The majority of the
Azerbaijanis were of Turkic descend, and approximately 95% of its population was of the
Muslim religion. Both countries were members of the Organization of Islamic
Conference. Since 1918, Azerbaijani had been in a hostile and continuous conflict with
its neighbor Armenia.
Just by looking at the demographics and the religious affiliations of both
countries, we would assume that in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict the Islamic Iran
would support its Muslim brothers in Azerbaijan. It was not a choice for Iran. It was a
mandatory task given under the Islamic Constitution and a religious obligation to their
fellow Muslims in need. Not only was Azerbaijan a Muslim country, but it was also
fighting to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity.
The conflict, as some may argue, had its roots in the awakening sense of identity
that arose during the last years of the capitulation of the Ottoman Empire. The demise of
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the Ottoman Empire set the stage for the promotion of the Pan-Turkism ideology, similar
to the Gamal Abdel Nasser‘s Pan-Arabism. Pan-Turkism promoted a sense of national,
linguistic, and historical commonality among the Turkic people (Croissant 1998, 8). The
Armenians, on the other hand, began to create their own unique identity based on their
history. Under the domination of the Ottoman Empire, they were considered by Turks as
the ―pro-Western fifth column‖ and became subject to persecution. This led the Ottomans
to implement their strategy of ―Armenian Question‖, which caused massive forced
deportation of and massacres against the Armenian populace during 1895-1895 and
1915-1916 periods (1998, 5). The massacre itself, the lack of support from the Christian
Europe, and other previous conquests produced the Armenian sense of uniqueness,
vulnerability, and self-reliance (1998, 5). At the same time, the Armenians perceived the
Azerbaijanis as Turks and grew a sense of animosity toward them.
The first confrontation between the Armenians and Azeris occurs in mid-1918
when Armenians began a large-scale aggression against Azerbaijan. The cause of the
conflict was the Azerbaijani province of Nagorno-Karabakh that was populated by a
popular majority of the Armenian descends. The Nagorno-Karabakh region was under the
sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan. At that time, both countries had proclaimed
their independence after the dissolution of the Transcaucasian Democratic Federative
Republic (incorporating Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia). However, both countries
were soon occupied by the 11th Red Army of Soviet Russia and the Soviet rule was
established. The Soviet rule lasted until the official collapse of the Soviet Empire in late
1991.
The Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was revived as a result of perestroika and
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glasnost policies implemented in 1985 by the new general secretary of the Soviet Union,
Mikhail Gorbachev. These policies provided more political freedom for citizens and
groups to express their concerns and objections about political matters. This new policy
motivated the Nagorno-Karabakh regional parliament to vote in favor of unifying the
autonomous region with Armenia on February 20, 1988. This decision was in response to
the Armenian claims that Azerbaijan‘s government was maltreating the Armenian
population, forcing the latter to abandon their homes. At that time, Armenians comprised
approximately 74% of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh (Melander 2001, 50). This
decision led to a series of violent anti-Armenian protests in Baku (2001, 58-59).
However, the conflict never escalated to an armed conflict between two republics
because any border change would be in violation of the Article 78 of the Soviet
Constitution. The Soviet leader was determined to apply this constitutional provision in
this matter.
The official collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and the withdrawal of
the Soviet troops from Karabakh (which was completed in March 1992) provided the
Karabakh forces with arms and provoked an offensive in early 1992 (Migdalovitz 2003,
3). On February 26, 1992, the Armenians seized the control of Khojaly, the second
largest Azeri town in Karabakh. On March 6, the Azeri public outrage over Khojaly led
to the ouster of the Azeri President. On May 9th, while Azerbaijan was caught by surprise
and under a political turmoil, the Armenians seized the opportunity to take Shusha, the
last Azeri town in Karabakh. Shusha fell to the Armenian rule while the Armenian
president, Levon Ter-Petrosian was conducting peace talks with the acting Azerbaijani
leader, Yaqub Mamedov, in Tehran (De Waal 2003, 180). The news from Karabakh
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became an embarrassment for the Iranians and all the other parties in meeting as well.
The capture of Shusha by the Armenians provoked a political chaos in Baku in which the
government changed twice in 24 hours (Migdalovitz 2003, 3; De Waal 2003, 181).
Meanwhile, the Armenians had also secured the ―Lachin corridor‖, a corridor joining
Armenia and Karabakh. The Armenian offensive continued against Nakhichevan city, in
which 30,000 people were displaced (Migdalovitz 2003, 3). In June 1992, Azerbaijan
began an offensive to regain Karabakh province. By 1993, the Armenians engaged in a
fierceful counteroffensive and managed to capture several villages in northern Karabakh.
The conflict escalated and the Armenian attacks spread on the southern areas of
Karabakh, resulting in a massive displacement of the Azeri population. On April 6, the
U.N. Secretary General implied that there were indications that Armenian army was
participating in the conflict. This statement forced the Armenian Defense Minister to
admit that the Armenian forces had fired on the Azeri positions. The U.S. State
Department identified that there was an unnecessary use of force by the Armenians in
several occasions based on the pretext of self-defense (Migdalovitz 2003, 3).
On July 29, the Security Council Resolution 853 condemned the Armenian
conquests, demanded an immediate cease-fire and unconditional withdrawal of
occupying forces, and appealed for direct negotiations within the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) framework. It also urged Armenia to pressure
Karabakh to comply. On August 18, the Security Council demanded cessation of fighting
and withdrawal of occupying forces from Fizuli, Kelbajar, and Aghdam. In addition, the
resolution called on Armenia to use its ―unique influence‖ to require a cease-fire and to
ensure that forces involved were not provided with the means to extend their campaign
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(2003, 4). On October 14, Security Council Resolution 874 called for a permanent ceasefire, a withdrawal timetable, and removal of communication and transportation obstacles.
The conflict continued until a cease-fire went into effect in May 1994.
Meanwhile, Iran had prepared its strategy to respond to this conflict. Before the
demise of the Soviet Empire (1998-1990), Iran did not interfere in the conflict and
considered it an internal affair of the Soviets. However, the collapse of the Soviet Empire
brought a new era of politics in the region. The dissolution was followed by the creation
of the new independent states of Armenia and Azerbaijan. Previously, Iran and
Azerbaijan had stable and friendly relations. However, after the declaration of the
independence by Azerbaijan, Iran became concerned about the links between its Northern
Azeri population and the new republic. In January 1993, Iran's Ministry of Interior,
General Foreign Citizen and Emigration Affairs Office, announced that ―any Iranian
citizen intending to marry a citizen from Azerbaijan must get a permit from the Ministry
of Interior‖ (Freij 1996, 72-73).
Throughout the conflict, Iran promoted a foreign policy that endeavored to
contain the impact of the conflict outside Iran‘s borders. Many believed that Iran‘s policy
toward the conflict would be neutral due to domestic and international pressure from both
sides (Gresh 2006, 4). However, the situation proved that neutrality was not the case. The
conflict caused a massive displacement of the Azerbaijani population to its neighboring
Iran. By the beginning of 1993, Iran mobilized military troops to its northern borders and
provided humanitarian aid to feed the Azerbaijani refugees. In addition, Iran built refugee
camps within Azerbaijan‘s borders. By building refugee camps within the Azerbaijani
territory, the Iranian authorities aimed at preventing the rise of any possible sense of
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affinity between the Azerbaijani refugees and the Azeris living in the northwest of Iran.
In addition, aware of the impact of the conflict, Iran attempted to negotiate a
ceasefire in 1992. However, this attempt failed due to the intensification of fighting
between the Azerbaijani and Armenian troops. Meanwhile, Iran was faced with a fierce
anti-Iranian rhetoric and calls for Azerbaijani unification coming from the newly-elected
president of Azerbaijan, Abulfez Elchibey. Iran opposed Azerbaijan and its new antiIranian policies by aligning itself with Armenia. By the end of 1992, Iran and Armenia
signed a bilateral treaty of friendship and economic cooperation (Gresh 2006, 5). Rumors
were spread that Iran had allowed the transit of weapons from Russia headed to Armenia
during the conflict. It was also reported that Iran trained the Armenian secret army forces,
which were directly involved in the conflict (2006, 5). The Iranian-Armenian relations
reached the pinnacle when Iran provided economic assistance to Armenia during the
trade embargo imposed on Armenia by Turkey and Azerbaijan in 1994.
But what are the forces driving Iran‘s policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan
conflict? For Iran, the collapse of the Soviet Empire and the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict
inflicted a sense of fear regarding the Iranian role in the region and the security threat that
these events pose to the Iranian sovereignty. The demise of the Soviet Empire signaled a
new configuration of powers in the region. After breaking relations with the United States
and the fall of communism, Iran lost the privileged status that it had had for the
containment of Communism in the Middle East. The demise of Communism led to the
birth of another regional ideology—pan-Turkism. Many began to envision a federation of
all Turkic people, extending from Turkey to Himalayas (Hunter 2003, 137). A Turkic
hegemony in the region would severely jeopardize Iran‘s regional interests and
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ambitions. It would cause a chain reaction that would later challenge even the sovereignty
and the territorial integrity of the Islamic state of Iran. Iran feared that pan-Turkism might
motivate the Azeri minority of Turkic descend in the northern Iran to demand secession
from the Islamic state.
To make the matter worse, Iran feared that the newly independent Republic of
Azerbaijan could claim the rights over the Azeri province in northern Iran, or what the
latter called the Southern Azerbaijan. This fear of insecurity and national unrest became a
real concern for Iran in 1992 when Abulfez Elchibey, a nationalist and anti-Iranian,
became the president of Azerbaijan. Elchibey publicly declared his government‘s
aspiration for unification with the Southern Azerbaijan (Souleimanov and Ditrych 2007,
104; Gresh 2006, 4). He supported the idea of the Greater Azerbaijan, which holds that
the Azerbaijani national unity was split into northern and southern halves by imperial
Russia and Iran and should therefore reunite (Sadegh-Zadeh 2008, 38). Iran also feared
that this situation could lead to separatist movement by the Azeri minority (which
comprises about 24% of the Iranian population) to secede from Iran and join the Republic
of Azerbaijan. This would not end here. The Iranian authorities also thought that a
potential Azeri separatist movement might serve as an incentive for separatist movements
from Arabs in South (3% of the Iranian population), Kurds in West (7%), Turkmen (2%)
in Northeast, and Baluchis (2%) in Southeast of Iran (Sadegh-Zadeh 2008, 36).
Besides the impact of the Azeris separatist movements, Iran feared a possible
involvement of the neighboring states and the U.S. in destabilizing and weakening Iran.
Iran feared that Turkey might assume, under the support and blessing from the United
States, the role that Iran had previously maintained in the Middle East during the Shah
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era. The history had given Iran all the reasons to fear other states and look at their
intentions with suspicion. Saddam attacked the Islamic Iran in 1980 motivated primarily
by his desire to make Iraq a regional hegemony. The attack happened in a time when Iran
was perceived as less powerful and after U.S. has stopped its weaponry assistance to Iran.
Twelve years later, Iran feared that history might repeat itself.
In addition, Iran‘s policy toward the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was shaped by
Iran‘s need to have close relationship with Russia. From this perspective, the Iranian
policy toward this conflict had the same goals as the Iranian policy toward the RussiaChechnya conflict, as analyzed previously. Iran considered Russia a crucial force to
contain and confront the Turkish and U.S. influence in the region. At the same time,
Russia was Iran‘s primary source of weaponry assistance. Nothing was more important
for Iran than building of military capabilities. Iran was aware of what other states, like
Russia or Armenia, were gaining from the cooperation with it. However, the Iranian
officials believed that by enhancing military capabilities through cooperation, they would
maximize their relative gains. Iran also believed that the balance of power served Iran‘s
long-term interests. Iran was not concerned about short-term gains. What mattered the
most for Iran was becoming a potential regional hegemony in the future. A hegemonic
status would provide Iran with more security and leverage on regional and global issues.
To reach the hegemonic status, Iran needed a strong state, a solid army, and a modern and
abundant military arsenal. Russia was considered a strategic partner to achieve this goal.
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Chapter Ten

Iran‘s Policy Toward the U.S. Invasion of Iraq
―...wherever Iran goes, it faces the United States. This includes Iraq.‖
Hassan Rowhani, Iranian Nuclear Negotiator
―That is right, but there is another side to it. Wherever the U.S. goes, it faces Iran.‖
Hussein Mousavian, Iranian Nuclear Negotiator (arrested in 2007 on espionage charges)
The Iranian security and foreign policy in the Middle East cannot be fully
comprehended without taking into account the U.S. policy in the region. There are three
main reasons why the U.S. and Iranian security and foreign policy are so intertwined and
interdependent on each other.
1. U.S. is the only state to have an indisputable military capability and influence
in the Middle East policy.
2. U.S. represents the most serious threat to the Islamic Republic of Iran.
3. After the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran sees itself as the most influential actor
and as a potential regional hegemony for in the future.
The coup d‘état perpetrated by the U.S. and British secret services against the
Iranian government of Mohammed Mosaddeq in 1953 consolidated the U.S. hegemony in
the Middle East for decades to come. Through this coup d‘état, the U.S sought to achieve
two main goals: (1) control over Iran‘s petroleum and (2) containment of the Soviet
expansion (Communism) in the Middle East. Besides the interests in the oil-rich field of
the region and the containment of Communism, its support to the state of Israel provided
another important reason for the U.S. presence in the Middle East.
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Despite the oil crises in 1973, the U.S. interests remained unchallenged until the
coming of the Iranian Islamic Revolution. The coming into power of the Islamic forces
caught U.S. by surprise and changed its regional policy for decades to come. In addition,
the hostage crises and the labeling of the United States by Ayatollah Khomeini as the
Great Satan stunned and humiliated the American government. Both countries entered in
a fierce battle of demonizing each other, one naming the other ―Great Satan‖ and member
of the ―axis of evil‖. The Islamic Republic of Iran saw the U.S. as the most serious threat
to its existence and interests in the Middle East. The United States, on the other hand,
saw the Islamic Iran as a threat to its security and economic interests in the region.
However, the regional politics (and global politics as well) changed radically and
profoundly after the U.S. invasion of Iraq (may call it also ―U.S. involvement in Iraq‖) in
2003 and the fall of the regime of Saddam Hussein. Rightfully, many analysts would
raise several questions about the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Why did U.S. invade Iraq and not
Iran? What may be the reasons behind this invasion, especially after it was revealed in
2002 that Iran was secretly engaged in a nuclear activity? Were the U.S. foreign relations
experts ignorant about regional politics in the Middle East and relations between Iraq and
Iran? While taking into account these questions, this case study will focus on the Iranian
security and foreign policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq.
The Americans government tried to convince its people and the international
community that the reason for invading Iraq was the possession of nuclear weapons by
Saddam. However, a reasonable analysis would conclude that it would be almost
impossible for a country to attack another country that possesses nuclear capabilities. If
such an attack were to be conducted, then both countries would risk entering in a mutual
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assured destruction (MAD) process. Thus, logically, it would be impossible for the
Congress to vote for a war whose consequences would remind the international
community of the nuclear bombardment of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They would
probably fear an Iraqi nuclear attack against Israel in case of an American attack on Iraq.
Indeed, the U.S. invasion of Iraq can be considered a preemptive attack which aimed at
disarming Iraq and limiting its capabilities to create a nuclear arsenal. In addition, the
U.S. officials may have feared that a nuclear Iraq might serve as a weaponry supporter
for the Al Qaida terrorists. The Americans also feared that Iraq might turn into a safe
haven for the Al Qaeda, from where the anti-American strategies would be launched.
Some may argue that the U.S. invasion of Iraq aimed at disturbing the balance of power
between Sunnis and Shi‘as. By doing this, U.S. would attempt to curtail the antiAmerican activity of the Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East. It could be done by
providing more power to Shi‘as, which are a minority in the Muslim world. However,
any of these scenarios does not indicate that the U.S.-Iran relations are friendly or
peaceful. Both U.S and Iran were playing to promote and protect their interests in the
region. U.S. was aware of the Iran-Iraq relations and Iran‘s ambitions in the region.
As expected, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was followed by the coming into power of
Shi‘a-dominated government in Iraq. Nothing has better served the Iranian regional
interests and none (besides the Iraqi people, especially Shi'a population) has profit more
from this invasion than the Islamic government of Iran. Iran saw this as an opportunity to
expand its influence and power in the region. As Vali Nasr argues, ―The Shi‘a
ascendancy in Iraq is supported by and is in turn bolstering another important
development in the Middle East: the emergence of Iran as a regional power‖ (Nasr,
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2007, p. 212). Years after the deposition of Saddam Hussein and the coming into power
of the Shi‘a forces, many analysts believe that Iraq is becoming a satellite of Iran and a
battleground for the U.S.-Iran confrontation.
The Iranian secret nuclear program discovered in 2002, followed by the new
opportunities coming from the destruction Iraq and its Sunni-led government, provides
clear indication why U.S. feared the Iranian politics and its quest to become a regional
hegemony. As an offshore balancer, U.S. would do everything to stop Iran from reaching
the hegemonic status in the region. With Saddam out of the political scene, U.S. is now
focused primarily on Iran. An Iranian hegemony would challenge and decrease the U.S.
influence in the Middle East, would threaten the U.S. historical ally, Israel, and would
profoundly alternate the balance of power in the region. Thus, the argument stands that
Iran,s security and foreign policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq was(is) influenced by
its need to survive, the desire to become a regional hegemony, and the threat that U.S.
imposes on its regime survival and its ambitions to become a regional hegemony.
The Iranian policy toward the U.S. invasion of Iraq provides a fundamental
support and explanation for this argument. In order to succeed in its security and foreign
policy agenda, and in addition to increasing its military capabilities, Iran implemented
two other main strategies: (1) the prevention of coming into power of Sunni forces, and
(2) lowering of the U.S. influence and power in the region. Iran was enhancing its
military capabilities by conducting ―asymmetric, low-intensity wars‖, modernizing its
weapons systems, developing ―indigenous‖ missile and antimissile systems, and
developing a nuclear program (Milani 2009).
Furthermore, the American invasion of Iraq and the fall of Saddam Hussein
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brought opportunities for the Islamic Iran to influence the political process within Iraq.
Soon after the fall of Saddam Hussein, Iran promoted an agenda to join all Iraqi Shi‘ite
factions in a cohesive group to participate in the post Bathist election process. For this
purpose, Iran managed to assemble all the factions in a Shiite Islamic bloc called United
Iraqi Alliance. The bloc encompasses the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), the
Da‟wa (Islamic Call) party, and the faction of the young cleric Moqtada Al Sadr. Iran's
goal was to take advantage of Iraqi's Shiite majority population and turn it into a source
of political power to control the state apparatus. The election results proved that the
Iranian strategy had worked: the bloc won 128 of the 275 seats in the December 15, 2005,
election for a full term parliament (Katzman, 2008, p. 1). The profile of the political
figures coming out of this election showed that they all had direct or indirect ties with
Iran. Nuri al-Maliki, who was selected as Prime Minister, was from the Da‟wa Party,
whose leaders were in exile mostly in Syria. Most leaders of ISCI had spent their years of
exile in Iran. In 1982, Ayatollah Mohammad Baqr Al Hakim, leader of ISCI, who was
killed in an August 2003 car bomb in Najaf, was anointed by then Iranian leader
Ayatollah Khomeini to head a future ―Islamic Republic of Iraq‖ (Duss and Juul, 2009, p.
10).
In addition to enhancing its military capabilities and taking the control of the Iraqi
state, Iran put significant emphasis on its strategy of gaining power and weakening the
American military power and influence in the region by using military and paramilitary
groups. Iran also found it vital for its interests and security to not allow any permanent
establishment of the U.S. military bases in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq
would be a permanent threat to Iran‘s national security and fortifications for the U.S.
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military forces in the Middle East. This led Iran to consider several strategies to enhance
its security status and to diminish the U.S. political and military power.
In his theory of offensive realism, John Mearsheimer argues that there are four
main strategies through which a state can gain power relative to the others. First,
countries gain power by going to war with the other rival state. In our case, Iran could not
implement this strategy because it has no chance of winning a war against the U.S.
mighty military forces. Second, states gain power by threatening rival states to use
military forces against them--‖blackmail‖. Iran didn‘t even think about this strategy
because it did not have sufficient military capabilities to challenge the U.S. military
power. Third, the bait and bleed strategy causes to rivals to engage in a ―protracted war‖,
so that ―they bleed each other white, while the baiter remains on sideline with its military
strength intact‖ (Mearsheimer, 2001, pp. 147-155). This is the case when one state causes
other states to go in war with each other and the ―baiter‖ would be free in the future to
expand its power. As mentioned previously, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was not provoked
or instigated by Iran. It was a result of the U.S. fear of Iraq running nuclear facilities and
supporting terrorism. The last strategy that states implement to gain power is the
bloodletting strategy, which aims at causing rival states to fight against each other in a
long and costing conflict.
This last strategy best describes the Iranian strategy in Iraq. First, Iran did not
have any implication in starting the invasion, but just benefited from it. Second, a long
and costing conflict would weaken the American power in the region and would keep
Iraq in ruins for decades to come. Thus, by promoting this strategy, Iran ―killed two birds
with one stone‖: (1) kept Iraq out of competition for regional hegemonic power, which
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may also turn in a servant of Iran's ambitions, and (2) kept America ―bleeding‖, resulting
in declining of its regional political and military influence.
Following the above strategy of ―bloodletting‖, Iran provided political and
military support to ISCI‘s militia, the ―Badr Brigades‖. The Badr Brigades had been
recruited, trained, and armed by Iran‘s Revolutionary Guard, the most politically
powerful actor of Iran‘s military during the Iran-Iraq war and in the current Iran
(Katzman, 2008, p. 1). In addition, the Iranian leaders have sought to establish close
relationship with Sadr‘s faction, a large and dedicated following among lower-class Iraqi
Shiites, and which built an estimated 60,000 person ―Mahdi Army‖ (Jaysh al-Mahdi, or
JAM) militia after Saddam‘s fall (2008, p. 2). JAM became very aggressive toward the
U.S. troops and the pro-U.S. Iraqi's politicians. In most occasions, they would try to
eliminate pro-American politicians. Iran soon realized that JAM would be the best
political and military group through which Iran could gain power, prevent U.S. from
establishing its hegemony and military settlements, and help Iran in any possible IranU.S. confrontation. In 2005, Iran began supplying arms to the JAM through the
Revolutionary Guard‘s ―Qods (Jerusalem) Force,‖ the unit that assists Iranian protégé
forces abroad (2008, p. 2).
Moreover, Iran‘s arming and training of Shiite militias in Iraq had been in
continuation of the U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran‘s nuclear program and regional
ambitions, such as its aid to Lebanese Hezbollah and the Palestinian organization Hamas
(2008, p. 3). For example, the U.S. officials had provided specific information on Qods
Force and Hezbollah aid to the Iraqi Shiite militias, but without detailed number of the
operatives. The Qods Force officers were not combatant forces. Their main task was to
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identify Iraqi trainees and create traffic route for weapon shipment into Iraq. In addition,
in his report to the members and committees of Congress, Kenneth Katzman, Specialist
in Middle Eastern Affairs for the Congressional Research Service, provided the
following information about the Iran support for armed groups:
On February 11, 2007, U.S. military briefers in Baghdad provided what
they said was specific evidence that Iran had supplied armor-piercing
“explosively formed projectiles” (EFPs) to Shiite (Sadrist) militiamen. EFPs
have been responsible for over 200 U.S. combat deaths since 2003. In August
2007, Gen. Raymond Odierno, then the second in command and who in midSeptember 2008 will become overall commander in Iraq, said that Iran had
supplied the Shiite militias with 122 millimeter mortars that are used to fire on
the Green Zone in Baghdad. On August 28, 2008, the Washington Times
reported that pro-Sadr militias were now also using “Improvised Rocket
Assisted Munitions” — a “flying bomb” carrying 100 pounds of explosives,
propelled by Iranian-supplied 107 mm rockets. On July 2, 2007, Brig. Gen.
Kevin Bergner said that Lebanese Hezbollah was assisting the Qods Force in
aiding Iraqi Shiite militias, adding that Iran gives about $3 million per month to
these Iraqi militias. He based the statement on the March 2007 capture of
former Sadr aide Qais Khazali and Lebanese Hezbollah operative Ali Musa
Daqduq. They were allegedly involved in the January 2007 killing of five U.S.
forces in Karbala. (2008, p. 3)
To the above information can be added the testimony of General David Petraeus
on April 8-9, 2008, who stated that Iran continues to arm, train, and direct ―Special
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Groups‖ – radical and possibly breakaway elements of the JAM — and to organize the
Groups into a ―Hezbollah-like force to serve Iran‘s interests and fight a proxy war
against the Iraqi state and coalition forces...‖ (as cited in Katzman, 2008, p. 3). His
testimony culminated in his briefing to the press on October 7, 2007 when Gen. Petraeus
told journalists that Iran‘s Ambassador to Iraq, Hassan Kazemi-Qomi, was himself a
member of the Qods Force (Yates, 2007). Despite these revelations, nothing changed the
Iranian policy toward the U.S. involvement in Iraq.
Thus, the use of the armed groups against the U.S. forces and any other threat to
the Iranian security and interests shows that the Iranian regional hegemonic policy not
only was based on field operatives but was orchestrated by its high-ranking officials with
clear strategies in mind. The Islamic government of Iran considered the United States a
serious threat to its regime and national security and interests. The Iranians were aware
of the military power of the U.S and the impact that it would have if the Americans
established permanent military bases in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq
would mean permanent threat to Iran‘s national security and interests in the region. For
these reasons, Iran implemented political and military strategies to diminish and obstruct
the U.S. military influence and presence in the region. At the same time, in order to
increase its influence in the region, Iran has also continued the modernization of the
armed forces and the growth of its military arsenal. During an army parade on April 18,
2009, the Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad stated that "The power of the
Iranian armed forces is at the service of the nations ... and will help to preserve the
region's security and stability" (Dahl 2009).
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Chapter Eleven
Conclusion and Policy Implications
The case studies analyzed above indicate that Iran‘s security and foreign policy
during the post-Shah era is driven by its paramount need for survival and its quest for
regional hegemony in the Middle East. There are no major policy differences between the
today‘s Iran, the Iran we have seen throughout its history, and any state in the
international community. Iran behaves like any other state in the international system.
The Iran-Iraq war revealed that both countries possessed significant military capabilities
that could harm each other. It was the shift in the balance of power favoring Iraq and its
desire to become a regional hegemony that created the premises for Iraq to attack Iran.
In addition, the attack enforced the assumption that states can never be certain
about the intentions of the other states, even after signing agreements like the 1975
Algiers Agreement. Furthermore, Iran's ultimate ideology of survival dominated any other
ideological predisposition. The need for survival led leaders of the Islamic Iran to
entering in secret negotiations with countries they considered the Great and the Small
Satans. These negotiations helped Iran increase its military capabilities in order to
survive the Iraqi invasion.
In addition, during the Russian-Chechen conflict, Iran sided with the Christian
Russia and considered the conflict an ―internal affair‖. Iran calculated and feared that a
support for its Muslim brothers in Chechnya would cause Russia to stop providing
military assistance and military-related technology that Iran so desperately needed. In
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addition, in supporting the Chechen separatist movement, Iran would inadvertently
encourage the Azeri separatist movement in Northwestern Iran. Iran also feared that
Russia, in retaliation, would support the separatist movements in Iran. Thus, the main
strategy leading the security and foreign policy of the Islamic Iran toward the RussianChechen conflict was to enhance its military capabilities and to prevent any separatist
movements across. The paramount goal leading to this strategy was the survival of the
Islamic Republic of Iran, its sovereignty, and the ambition to become hegemony.
Moreover, during the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict, the Islamic Iran sided with the
Christian Armenians rather than with its Muslim brothers in Azerbaijan. This policy was
due to Iran‘s fear that the newly independent Republic of Azerbaijan could claim the
rights over the Azeri province in the northern Iran, or what they called the Southern
Azerbaijan. In addition, Iran feared a possible involvement of the neighboring states and
of the U.S. in destabilizing and weakening Iran. Iran feared that Turkey might assume,
under the support and blessing from the United States, the role that Iran had previously
maintained in the Middle East during the Shah era. Finally, Iran‘s policy toward the
Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was shaped by Iran‘s need to have close relationship with its
strategic partner, Russia.
Finally, during the U.S. invasion of Iraq, the Islamic government of Iran launched
strategies which aimed at diminishing and obstructing the U.S. military influence and
presence in the region. Iran considered the United States a serious threat to its regime and
national security and interests. The Iranians were aware of the military power of the U.S
and the impact that it would have if the Americans established permanent military bases
in Iraq. Permanent U.S. military bases in Iraq would mean permanent threat to Iran‘s
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national security and interests in the region.
Referring to the above case studies, we may realize that Iran sees the intentions of
other states with deep suspicions. For example, Iran sees the U.S. foreign policy more as
a threat to its regime survival rather than a behavior change. The Iranian past history of
occupations from foreigner states, especially the modern Iraq—Iran war of 1980s, make
Iran more suspicious of states‘ intentions. Iran has come to realize that in an anarchic
international system of politics, survival through self-help is all what matters. The
ultimate ideology of survival is superior to any other ideology. Iran also believes that in
order to survive, a state should have formidable military capabilities and endeavor to
shift the balance of power based on its interests. The nuclear program would give Iran a
regional hegemonic status, ensured survival, deterrence power, and bargaining power
over regional and global matters. Thus, Iran is not different from other states within the
international system. It bases its security and foreign policy on a rational choice analysis.
However, Iran should be aware of constraints that the international system puts
on its behavior. Iran should also be aware of the fact that U.S and Russia behave the
same way as Iran does. Thus, neither U.S. nor Russia would accept a nuclear Iran. A
nuclear Iran would challenge the U.S. interests in the region and would seriously
jeopardize the territorial security of its neighboring Russia. In order to prevail, Iran
should implement certain policies that would allow it to reach its goals. Having put the
international community and the U.S. policy in an uncertain position, the Iranian
government should send a message to the global community indicating that it is willing
to cooperate and talk about its nuclear activity. In addition, seeing that the
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) does not prohibit Iran from pursuing nuclear capability
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for economic purpose, it is imperative for Iran to lower its rhetoric against the state of
Israel and focus on the legal aspect of its nuclear activity. Iran has to realize that there is
no great power in the international system that would accept another nuclear power.
Thus, is should aim at building its nuclear capability, while the others will try to stop this
from happening. However, Iran should not push too hard for this goal because it may risk
an attack from U.S. and other powers. Israel also would be in alert and willing to take
unilateral actions against Iran in case of a perceived and imminent threat.
The best way for Iran to pursue its goal is to use the current balance of power to
achieve its goal. This means that Iran may use its policy to have other powers
confronting each other. For example, Iran may find a way or a strategy to put Russia,
China, and U.S. in different positions and pursuing different interests, while not ignoring
the influence of other states in the region. This will make them reach no consensus over
Iran‘s nuclear program. A consensus among great powers regarding Iran‘s nuclear
activity would be very unfortunate for Iran. In addition, Iran should pursue a regional
policy of cooperation with other countries in the region. It should not publicly call for the
overthrown of other regimes but should implement the strategy of ―divide and conquer‖.
Iran may also continue the use of the bait and bleed and bloodletting strategies of gaining
power. Iran must also be careful that its strategies do not compromise or jeopardize its
domestic base of support.
Regarding the American, Israeli, Russian approach toward Iran, it is imperative to
understand and assume that Iran‘s goal is to become a regional hegemony and build a
nuclear arsenal. In confronting Iran, U.S. should be cautious to not fall in the trap of the
Iranian policy and portray itself as the ―police of the world‖. To reach this goal, U.S.
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should provide incentives for the engagement of the international community in Middle
East issues. One particular strategy should focus on dealing with a productive
engagement of great powers like Russia and China. The goal is to use the United Nation
(through the Security Council) as the main actor dealing with Iran. U.S. should
emphasize concerns about the Iranian nuclear activity and provide benefits for these
powers in case they succeed in stopping Iran.
In addition, U.S. should use regional states to force Iran stop its nuclear activity.
It should emphasize that a nuclear Iran is a threat to all states in the region. The best
strategy would be the formation of an anti-nuclear-Iran regional coalition. Finally, U.S.
should use the domestic factions in Iran to gain more intelligence and to decelerate the
pace of the nuclear activity. One example is the decision of the European Union to take
the People‟s Mojahideen Organization (PMOI) of Iran off the list of terrorist
organization and unfreeze its assets. As staunch opponent of the Iranian theocratic
regime, PMOI has promised to provide (and has provided) intelligence regarding the
Iran‘s nuclear activity and help overthrow the regime. Regardless of the circumstances,
both U.S. and Iran will not abandon their paramount goals. Iran will not stop pursuing its
ultimate ideology of survival and the need (quest) to be a regional hegemony. U.S. just
cannot accept a regional hegemony in the Middle East that would threatened its regional
and global status. Meanwhile, Russia will support Iran to that extent that Iran itself does
not become a threat to the security and interests of Russia. Russia will continue to
provide nuclear support to Iran as a way to challenge the U.S. interests in the Middle
East, but it will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Facing U.S. and Russia, Iran
should play the role that it once played with Russia and Great Britain in the nineteenth
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century. Meanwhile, Iran should be cautious to not promote policies that would cause
U.S. and Russia to cooperate with each other.
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